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I. INTRODUCTION
The currency and financial turmoil in East Asia in recent
.months has raised concerns about the financial systems and
macroeconomic policies in East Asia in the context of capital
account liberalization and increased international financial
integration. Specifically, the recent turmoil has brought to the
fore issues related to the health and stability of the financial
sectors of East Asian countries, problems related to the regulatory
climate and the institutional capacity of the regulatory institutions
in these countries, macroeconomic challenges posed by large
capital flows, and the structural adjustment problems facing the
economies themselves. It is to be noted that most of the countries
that have been affected by the current currency and financial
turmoil in the region also experienced financial and/or economic
crises in the early and mid-1980s, i.e., Korea, Thailand,
Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. The crises of the 1980s
were local although largely contemporaneous. In contrast, the
recent turmoil is a regionwide contagion, starting from Thailand.
The contagion effect reflects the greater interdependence of
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countries within East Asia through trade and investment since
the late 1980s, the larger magnitude of capital flows in the 1990s,
and the greater importance that portfolio capital has played in
financing, large current account deficits in the region in recent
years.
The Philippines, which experienced the deepest economic
decline and worst financial and economic crisis in the early
1980s among the East Asian countries, has been less adversely
affected by the current currency and economic turmoil in the
region. Analysts and observers consider that an important reason
behind the greater resilience of the Philippine economy to the
current regional crisis is its apparently more robust financial
sector compared to those of the other more adversely affected
countries. The apparently greater resilience of the country's
financial sector stems from the policy and institutional reforms
the country undertook during the past one and a half decades.
A number of the reforms redirected the nature of governance in
the financial sector but most of them centered on the overall
economy and policy environment. Nevertheless, as the recent
currency and financial turmoil in the region suggests, the
institutional and policy environment in the financial sector in
the country would need to be improved further in order to
effectively address the challenges of increased international
financial integration, greater competition among various financial
institutions, and continuing financial innovations and technology
improvements.
The paper discusses financial reform and development in the
Philippines during the past one and a half decades and the
challenges facing the financial sector (especially in respect to
improving its management) in the light of greater international
financial integration. The paper consists of eight sections. Section
II describes very briefly the ups and downs of the Philippine
economy during 1980-97. Section III discusses the major policy
reform efforts in the financial sector in the Philippines since
1980. Section IV looks into the microeconomics of financial reform
and development in the country. Section V discusses the
macroeconomic and microeconomic aspects of capital flows inINTAL& LLANTO:FINANCIALREFORM 3
the Philippines during the 1990s. Section VI focuses on the issue
of prudential regulation, especially on improving further the
prudential regulatory framework in the country. Section VII
considers areas for strengthening regulatory institutions. The last
section summarizeskey lessons from the Philippine and Southeast
Asian experience as well- as major policy recommendations to
push forward financial reforms and strengthen further the
Philippine financial sector.
Some analytical framework. Finance is special, not only
because it is an input to much economic activity but also because
it involves the exchange of a generally certain current asset with
an uncertain future asset and return (White 1995). The
development of the financial sector is intimateIy related to the
development of the whole economy. At the same time, instability
in the macroeconomy usually reverberates into the financial
sector, and vice versa.
Empirical studies indicate that the scope, quality and
efficiency of the financial system contribute to economic growth.
For example, Berthelemy and Varoudakis (1996) show a clear
positive relationship between the level of financial development
in 1960 (proxied by the ratio of liquid assets to GIUP in 1960)
and the level of per capita income in 1985; similarly, there is a
positive relationship between the level of financial development
and the rate of growth of per capita income during 1960-85.
The contribution of finance to growth is best seen in terms of an-
efficient and adaptable payments system (in order to have a
reliable means of payment) and in terms of saving mobilization
and resource pooling (Berthelemy and Varoudakis 1996).
Equally important and probably more problematic in terms
of policy is the direct and indirect role of the financial system in
screening and monitoring investments among "firms" rather than
just among sectors. This latter role stems from the creation,
dissemination and utilization of information by financial
institutions inherent in their provision of financial services so
that they can intermediate differences in time preferences,
investment opportunities and risk preferences among different
households, firms and other economic agents, taking into4 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
consideration problems of moral hazard, adverse selection and
incentives in the face of asymmetric information (Dietrich !996;
Stiglitz 1989). Financial markets improve the utilization of capital
and productive efficiency of the whole economy and enhance
the international competitiveness of the economy by screening
and monitoring "investment projects," managing and diversifying
various kinds of risks, and designing contracts and institutional
arrangements to address the problems of adverse selection and
moral hazard.
The special character of finance - with its attendant risk
management, and the screening and monitoring roles of the
financial system - has important implications on the use of
alternative financial instruments and the development of financial
institutions. First, informal finance is likely most prevalent in
the early stages of economic development because traders and
moneylenders have greater and longer access at less cost to local-
and person-specific information needed for effective screening
and monitoring. Second, within the formal financial sector,
banks rather than the securities or bond markets are the major
sources of financing because debt contracts with fixed repayment
schedules prevail over equity financing in cases where there are
productivity 1sks, asymmetry of information between lenders
and borrowers, and costly monitoring processes (Berthelemy and
Vasoudakis 1996). Third, among banks, universal banks (which
can hold shares of enterprises and are represented in the
management boards of enterprises) may have advantages over
regular banks in attenuating the problems of asymmetry of
information and the conflict of interest between shareholders
and lenders (Berthelemy and Varoudakis 1996). And fourth, as
the information base and analytic capacity deepens within the
financial institutions and external specialized information
gathering and analysis institutions (e.g., rating agencies) in a
country develop, and as the secondary market for financial
instruments grows, the distinct advantages of equity financing
(especially the sharing of risks between entrepreneurs and
providers of credit) and bonds (which allow firms to pursue
long-term projects) become more salient. As a result, securitiesINTAL& LLANTO:FINANCIALREFORM 5
and bond markets grow in importanc e, although not to the same
degree as banks (see Stiglitz 1989). In short, financial development
is a long process of building institutions, deepening the
information base and analytic capacities, and developing niches
in value creation in financial services through a widening array
of instruments, arrangements and contracts in response to the
changing environment and needs of firms, households and other
eco_omic agents. ., ....
However, financial markets are particularly Vulnerable to
economic booms and bust •because of the intertemporal nature
of financial transactions, the leveraged nature of banks (with
their liabilities greater than their net worth), and the problems
of asymmetric information and hnperfect information_ markets.
Indeed, financial institutions are very much in the center of such
booms and busts. Investment boom means sharply higher demand
for credit. Where prudential regulations and monitoring of banks
by the government are not effective, credit expansion during an
investment boom increases the fragility of banks and the financial
system. This is especially the case where domestic credit i
expansion is facilitated by, or•complemented by, foreign borrowing
by the banks themselves or domestic firms, respectively, under
generally fixed exchange rate regimes. At the same time, the
highly leveraged nature of banks makes them susceptible to loss
of confidence by depositors (the banks' major source of external
funds) and bank runs. Thus, in many cases, economic crises are
preceded (if not triggered) by bank runs and financial crises. In
short, the same characteristics of the financial system and financial
transactions that require a long period of time in order for the
financial system to deepen, widen and strengthen are also the
same characteristics thatmake the financial system Vulnerable
to and intimately involved in economic booms and busts and
financial crises.
The discussion above indicates that, because of the inherent
imperfections of the financial market, the government plays a
critical role in the management and development of the financial
sector. Three major areas of concern stand out. The first is the
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term deepening of the finan¢i.al system..The second is the
development of competitive and prudential conditions of the
various interacting financial submarketsfor a more efficient and
stable financial system.. And the third area of concern is the
strengthening of prudential regulation and supervision as well
as the regulatory institutions themselves.
The Philippine economy, 1980-97._ The Philippines experienced
an economic roller coaster ride .during the 1980s and the 1990s.
The Philippine economy weiit from a tailspin in the early 1980s
to a deep recession during. 1984-85, recovered gradually through.
the latter 1980s, stagnated_during 1991-92 and registered a solid.
recovery from 1994. to the first half of 1997 but is expected to
slow down in 1998 because of the current regional currency and
financial turmoil.
After a strong growth in the 1970s, the Philippines slid into
a debt and economic crisis in the early 1980s. Gross national
product (GNP) progressively decelerated during 1981-83 and
then declined by 7.1 percent in 1984 and another 4.1 percent, in
1985. The progressive deterioration of the Philippine economy
has many roots, including the following: the external debt-
financed investment boom of the latter 1970s was inefficiently
allocated as indicated by a high and. rising incremental capital-
output ratio, the sharp deterioration in the country's external
terms of trade, the largely inward-oriented trade and industrial
policy that made the economy increasingly vulnerable to external
shocks, a deepening crisis in the financial sector that shook
depositors' confidence, a worsening external debt structure
whereby short-term external debt reached 25 percent of total
external debt and more than 100 percent of the country's gross
international reserves by 1981, and the heightened political
uncertainty arising from the assassination in 1983 of the then
leading political opposition leader.. The moratorium on external
debt payments in October 1983 led to a cut-off in external
financing and, given the country's low level of international
reserves, necessitated import compression that led to the decline
in overall economic activity in 1984-85. Per capita income fell
by about 20 percent during 1982-86, thereby providing anINTAL&LLANTO:FINANCIALREFORM 7
important underpinning to the political upheaval and eventual
change in the government administration in 1986 (Intal and
Pante 1991).
The Philippine economy recovered during the 1986-90 period,
with GNP growing at an average rate of 3.7 percent per annum.
The economic recovery was aided by the improvement in the
external terms of trade, the restructuring of foreign loans and
increase in the level of foreign aid, the improvement in investor
sentiment and rise in the investment rate, and an initial
government pump priming program that saw an increase in the
government deficit during the period. However, the recovery led
to sharply higher imports and rising trade and current account
deficits, in addition, the domestic financing of the government
deficit, together with the targe losses of the Central Bank amid a
weak domestic financial sector, led to rising inflationary pressures
and the crowding out of the private sector from the domestic
credit market. The fragile domestic macroeconomic environment
was aggravated by major domestic political and natural shocks,
especially the December 1989 coup attempt and a major
earthquake in 1990. The government undertook a tight
macroeconomic policy and imposed import levies in order to
prevent turning the brewing balance-of-payments problem into
another full-blown crisis. Moreover, another major natural-
disaster struck the country in 1991 (i.e., the eruption of Mt.
Pinatubo and the consequent problem of lahar or pyroclastic
flows in the country's erstwhile rice bowl) while the uncertainties
in the international oil market resulting from the Gulf War
provided an additional adverse external shock to the oil-importing
country. As a result, the Philippine economy stagnated during
1991-92.
The Philippine economy recovered strongly starting in 1994.
Because the Philippines had been undertaking a wide range of
policy and institutional reforms since the latter half of the 1980s,
the economic recovery was underpinned by strengthening
macroeconomic and structural foundations. GNP growth
averaged about 5.9 percent per year from 1994 to the third
quarter of 1997 as compared to only 2.2 percent per annum8 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
during 1990-93. Merchandise exports grew in real terms at an
average of 13;2 percent per annum during 1994-97, more than
twice the 5.2 percent average growth rate per annum during •
1990-93.. The-investment rate increased significantly from 19.8
percent in 1991 to 26.9 percent during the first semester of 1997.
The acceleratioh in the economic activity occurred in the context
of a fiscal :surplus of 0.6 percent of GNP during 1994-96 as
against a fiscal deficit of 2.1 percent of GNP during 1990-93. In
addition, the inflation rate declined drastically from 18.7 percent
in 1990 to 4.7 percent during the first seven months of 1997 (see
Intal and Basilio 1997). The recent currency and economic turmoil
in the region has clouded growth prospects for 1998 although
the country has had greater success so far in weathering the
current regional currency and financial turmoil compared to
Thailand, Indonesia and Korea.
II. FINANCIAL REFORM: IMPERATIVES AND REGU-
LATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES
Imperatives. The Dewey Dee Affair I in January 1981, which
marked the start of the crisis in the country's financial sector,
can arguably be considered also as the start of the gathering
economic storm in the country that culminated in a deep
economic recession during 1984-85. The financial crisis, which
contributed substantially to the emergence of the economic crisis,
deepened over the course of the economic crisis, thereby
exacerbating the economic crisis itself and posing constraints to
the economic recovery process (Nascimento 1991). The financial
crisis heightened the imperative for deepening the financial
reform process in order to address regulatory and institutional
weaknesses in the sector. The financialreform program, initiated
1. Dewey Deewas an industrial magnatewho borrowed heavily in the commercial
paper market and fled the country in January 1981, leaving several millions of debt in
pesos. This led to insolvencies of investment houses and finance companies with
significant exposures on him. Smalldepositors shifted their funds to commercial banks.
The Dewey Dee Affair triggered the collapse of the commercial paper market in 1981
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earlier than the financial crisis, was implemented over the course
of the 1980s and the 1990s. Financial reforms in the Philippines
did not start under crisis conditions but gathered momentum in
the aftermath of the crisis.
The iniiJal impetus for reforms was the rapid expansion and
apparent fragmentation of the banking system during the 1950s
and 1960s in part because of the passage of various banking
laws. The expansion of the banking system and the emergence
of new financial intermediaries posed growing challenges to the
Central Bank (CB) because the regulatory system was still
rudimentary: e.g., minimum initial Capital was not enforced
except as a precondition for availment of the CB rediscount
window; monitoring and examination of bank operations were
confined to compliance with the 15 percent risk-asset solvency
ratio and required reserves (Bautista 1992).
A Joint IMF-CB Banking Survey Commission was estabIished
in 1971 to review the overall system and make recommendations.
Based on the Commission's recommendations, a number of
amendments were incorporated into the General Banking Act
and the Central Bank Act in 1972-73. Apart from a redefinition
of types of financial institutions and a clarification of rules and
incentives as they relate to Central Bank's authority and
responsibility, the amendments included the elimination of the
pursuit of economic growth as part of CB's responsibilities and
the prohibition on new banks. In addition, the Central Bank
allowed the entry of foreign banks primarily through equity
participation in domestic banks andthe creation of offshore
banking units. An IMF-IBRD Financial Sector Survey was also
conducted in 1979. Among the recommendations of the 1979
survey were the deregulation of interest rates and the introduction
of "universal" banking to reduce the fragmentation of the
financial system. The recommendations began to be implemented
in 1980 with the gradual liberalization of interest rates, the
adoption of universal banking and the increase in minimum
capitalization of banking institutions, with the highest level of
minimum capitalization imposed on "universal" banks. (See
World Bank 1988.)10 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
The financial crisis, however, brought out the serious
deficiencies of the Philippine financial system. Central Bank
supervision of banks was weak,, encouraging loose banking
practices. Capital requirements, defined as the ratio of net worth
to risk assets, were reduced from 15 to 10 percent in- 1973 and,
after 1980, even to 6 percent with the approvaIof the Monetary
Board. The Central Bank also relaxed its rules by 1980 regarding
credit accommodation to directors, officers, stockholders, and
related interests (DOSRI). Given the interest rate regime which
encouraged debt-financed investments together with the
prevalence of political accommodation in lending, the relaxation
of rules (and the weak enforcement of .such rules) led to
substantial lending to DOSRI that significantIy contributed to
bank failures and weakening of the financial sector. Political
accommodation in bank lending was particularly acute in the
two largest government banks, the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP),
leading to their technical insolvency at the height of the financial
crisis which consequently required the transfer of huge
nonperforming loans to the government to assist their
rehabilitation. (See Nascimento 1991 for details.) 2
The 1980 reforms did not include Central Bank rules on the
treatment of overdue loans, the provisioning of debt and the
examination of deposit transactions by CB examiners. This
contributed to the worsening of the financial crisis. In addition,
the nonuniform supervisory rules over money market operations
by the Central Bank (which had jurisdiction over nonbank quasi-
banks and monitored transactions on a "with recourse" basis)
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (which supervised
other participants and monitored transactions on a "without
recourse" basis) led nonbank quasi-banks to circumvent CB
regulations and monitoring of their money market operations,
including their practice of issuing less-than-prime commercial
papers. These practices led to the collapse of the commercial
paper market in 1981 triggered by the Dewey Dee Affair.
2. This paragraph and the succeeding paragraph are-based on Nascimento (1991).INTAL&LLANTO:FINANCIAL REFORM 11
The Central Bank also expanded its developmental functions
in the 1970s by overseeing the implementation of a number of
selective credit programs to target or favor industries and their
funding through the rediscount window. The liberal access to
the CB rediscount window by the rural banks ultimately
undermined the rural banking system because the banks became
largely conduits of cheap government funds, neglecting the
mobilization of deposits and the judicious management of loan
portfolios. When arrearages mounted in the late 1970s and the
access to the rediscount window became restrictive, many rural
banks became insolvent. (See Bautista 1992.) Similarly, the Central
Bank's relaxation of foreign capital controls, especially with the
access of domestic residents to dollar loans from the foreign
currency deposit units of banks, encouraged overborrowing in
the face of negative real foreign interest rates in the late 1970s
and negative real domestic lending rates in 1979 and 1980. The
mounting external debt, increasingly short term in maturity,
eventually led to the debt and economic crisis in the country in
1983-85.
Reforms. The most important reforms in the financial sector
cover important areas such as institutional reforms and the
rehabilitation of the financial system, interest rate reforms and
the liberalization of the foreign exchange market. (See Bautista
1992; Lamberte 1993; and Lamberte and Llanto 1993 for details.)
Institutional reforms. In the light of several bank failures in
the 1980s, the government toughened prudential regulations
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. These include regulations
on single borrower limit, limits on DOSRI loans and interlocking
directorship, capital adequacy, compliance with the minimum
risk-asset ratio, and provisions for loan loss or doubtful accounts.
(a) Single Borrower Limit. The single borrower's limit of 15 percent
of the unimpaired capital and surplus of banks was imposed through
the 1980s although the limit has been increased to 25 percent recently.
However, contingent liabilities have been included in the single
borrower limit. The regulation limits the aggregate ceiling of the
guarantee to 50 percent of a bank's unimpaired capital and, with
some exceptions, surplus standby letters of credit.12 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
(b) DOSRI Loans￿Interlocking Directorship. DOSRI loans
should not exceed at any one time the outstanding deposits and
book value of paid-in capital of the borrowing bank officer in
the lending bank. In addition, unsecured credit accommodation
should not exceed 30 percent of total credit accommodation to
the borrowing office. Also, the borrowing official must sign a
waiver of his right to confidentiality of deposits in case the loan
is secured by assignment of deposits. Similarly, there shall be no
concurrent officership of a bank and a nonbank financial
institution or of two banks if the majority interest is held by one
bank, without the approval of the Monetary Board. These rules
are meant to prevent insider abuse, which contributed to bank
failures in the early 1980s.
(c) Capital Adequacy. The minimum capital requirement for
banks was steadily increased over lime to help improve the stability
of the banking system. For example, the minimum capital
requirement for universal banks was increased from 500 million
pesos in 1980 to 1.0 billion pesos in 1990, 2.5 billion pesos in
1995 and 4.5 billion pesos in 1996 (to be met by 1999). Similarly,
the minimum capital requirement for ordinary commercial banks
was steadily increased from 100 million pesos in 1980 to 500
million pesos in 1990, 1.25 billion pesos in 1995 and 2.0 billion
pesos by 1998 or so. Thrift banks were also required to significantly
increase their minimum capital from 20 million pesos in 1980 to
150 million pesos currently for those with headquarters in Metro
Manila. The rise in capital requirement, while an entry barrier,
helped banks weather financial volatility and contributed to
greater confidence in the stability of the system. Historically, the
Central Bank has strongly encouraged bank mergers as a way of
meeting the rising minimum capital requirement. One reason
for this is that Philippine banks are small compared to their
counterparts in the East Asia region.
(d) Audit and Reporting Requirement. The Central Bank now
requires an annual financial audit of banks by independent
auditors. Banks are required to maintain complete records of all
pertinent loan documents and to make them available for
examination/inspection. The Central Bank established aINTAL& LLANTO:FINANCIALREFORM 13
monitoring and review system in the management of loan
portfolio and other risk assets. In response to the recent currency
and financial turmoil in the region, the Monetary Board raised
the required loan loss reserves. Also, the Central Bank 3 has
proposed new disclosure rules requiring banks to make periodic
reports that are more detailed than current reports of their loan
exposures (including nonperforming loans, restructured loans,
DOSRI loans, loan loss provisions for specific accounts, etc.)
starting March 1998 to provide authorities advance warning on
the health of the financial institutions (Philippine Daily Inquirer,
January 1, 1998, p. B1). All of the increasingly more detailed
and stringent reporting and disclosure rules help improve the
transparency of the financial system.
Rehabilitation and restructuring of the financial system.
Apart from the strengthening of prudential regulations, the
government undertook the rehabilitation and restructuring of
the financial sector during the 1980s and early 1990s. PNB and
DBP, which accounted for nearly 50 percent of all banking assets,
became insolvent in 1985 due to a host of reasons including the
predominance of politically motivated loans, poor internal
controls, the takeover of troubled corporations, and the sharp
devaluation of the peso (Nascimento 1991). The rehabilitation of
the two institutions effectively involved a government bailout, as
most of their nonperforming assets were transferred to the
national government at the same time that the national
government assumed the banks' nongovernment deposit liabilities
(which eventually formed part of government debt). The banks
were recapitalized, restructured and streamlined with sharply
lower assets after the transfer of the nonperforming assets to the
national government. The rehabilitation programs were successful,
with PNB turning in one of the highest rates of profitability and
eventually becoming privatized successfully (with the national
3. With the Central Bank's rehabilitation in 1993, its name was changed to Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). In this paper, Central Bank and BSP are used interchangeably
especially in the discussion of recent events and the policy recommendations of the
paper.14 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
government remaining a minority equity player) and the DBP
strengthening its niche in wholesale banking and overseeing the
industry-related credit guarantee (e.g., Industrial Guarantee and
Loan Fund) and specialized credit programs of the government
(e.g., ASEAN-Japan Development Fund).
The government also undertook a rehabilitation program for
the battered rural banking sector in 1986 through a capital
buildup program. Nearly one-half of the licensed rural banks
were approved for capital buildup under the program. But
perhaps the most important rehabilitation program undertaken
by the government was the rehabilitation of the Central Bank
itself. The Central Bank generated losses in its operations,
specifically from forward cover losses, losses from swap
arrangements, and interest rate losses during the 1980s. The CB
losses made macroeconomic manage-ment much more difficult
(Lamberte 1993; Vaez.-Zadeh 1991). The rehabilitation of the
Central Bank was implemented through the enactment of a new
Central Bank Act of 1993 creating an independent monetary
institution with a large capitalization. In addition, problem assets
of the old Central Bank were transferred to a separate body for
liquidation. The new Central Bank, now called Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas (BSP), began to register surpluses, and this was the
expected normal state of affairs for an institution with monopoly
power over monetary creation.
Liberalization of bank entry and branching. In contrast to
the restrictive policies of the 1980s, the government liberalized
bank branching and entry into the banking system during the
1990s. In 1983, commercial banks and thrift banks were required
to purchase 5-year Central Bank Certificates of Indebtedness; the
following year, bank branching was suspended in so-called heavily
branched, overbranched and ideally underbranched areas. It was
in 1989 that restrictions on new branches in rural areas were lifted.
Finally, in 1993, banks were allowed to open, branches anywhere
so long as requirements on capital adequacy, liquidity, profitability
and soundness of management were met (Paderanga 1995).
New commercial banks were also allowed. One process was
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into a commercial bank as long as the requirements of commercial
banks were met. But the most important policy change with
respect to bank entry was the liberalization of entry of a number
of foreign banks (in addition to the existing four) in 1994, either
as fully-owned full-service branches (of which only 10 banks
were allowed), through equity purchase in an existing bank, or
the establishment of a joint venture between foreign and local
groups.
Interest rate reforms. The interest rate policy regime in the
Philippines was for a long time shaped by the Usury Act of 1916
which set ceilings on secured and unsecured loans. Accordingly,
the Central Bank also set ceilings on deposit interest rates in
1956. It was only in 1976 that the Usury Act was abolished. In
the 1970s, the Central Bank adjusted administratively the level
and structure of interest rates. In 1976, the Central Bank also set
interest rate ceilings on deposit substitutes in order to prevent
the flow of financial savings deposits to deposit substitutes.
Nevertheless, in response to the recommendation of the IMF-
World Bank Financial Sector Study of 1979, the Central Bank
started easing the ceiling rates and eventually removed them.
All bank rates, except for short-term loans and purchases of
short-term receivables, were deregulated in 1981. Short-term
lending rates were deregulated at the start of 1983.
Related to the interest rate reform is the reform of the Central
Bank rediscount policy. Hitherto, the rediscount window was a
source of subsidized credit to favored sectors through higher
rediscount values and lower rediscount rates compared to less
favored sectors. With the overhauling of the rediscount facility,
all rediscount values and rates were made uniform. Moreover,
the rediscount rate was aligned to the market rate, based on the
Manila Reference Rate (MRR) 90 which is a weighted average of
interest rates on promissory notes and time deposits with 90-day
maturity. Also related to this was the transfer of directed credit
and guarantee schemes from the Central Bank to other
institutions, specifically to the Development Bank of the
Philippines for the Industrial Guarantee and Loan Fund and to
the Land Bank of the Philippines for the Agricultural Loan Fund.16 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
With the interest rate and CB rediscount policy reforms,
interest rates are now, in principle, market-determined. This
shows that, in effect, the government influenced the level and
structure of interest rates through indirect measures and no
longer through direct administrative mechanisms.
Foreign exchange market reforms. Up until the 1980s, the
foreign exchange market and foreign exchange transactions were
highly regulated. For example, exporters could retain at most 2
percent of their dollar proceeds; invisible foreign exchange receipts
needed to be converted into pesos in banks within 3 days; limits
were set on foreign exchange purchases for travel, educational
and medical expenses, and support of dependents abroad;
outward investment by residents was not allowed; repatriation
and remittance of investments had to be staggered over 3-9
years with Central Bank approval; etc. The foreign exchange
market was effectively segmented into three submarkets, with
off floor trading among banks prohibited and the parallel market
considered to be as large as the official customer market between
banks and their customers. (See Lamberte and Llanto 1993.)
The liberalization of the foreign exchange market during the
early 1990s involved the elimination of the restrictions in the
current account and sharply reduced regulations on inward and
outward capital flows. Thus, for example, exporters can now
retain 100 percent of their foreign exchange earnings; there are
no limits on foreign exchange purchases; there is full and
immediate repatriation of investment without CB approval for
foreign investments duly registered with the Central Bank or
custodian bank; etc. At the same time, the Central Bank lifted
the prohibition on off-floor foreign exchange trading (Lamberte
and Llanto 1993). The reforms have transformed a highly
regulated foreign exchange market with significant controls on
capital flows into a highly deregulated one, with the country
having a virtually open capital account.INTAL&LLANTO:' FINANCIAL REFORM. 17
III. THE MICROECONOMICS OF FINANCIAL
REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT
Structure of the Philippine financial sector. The Philippine
(formal) financial sector covers a wide range of bank and nonbank
financial institutions. The banking sector consists of commercial
banks (both universal banks and regular commercial banks),
thrift banks (savings banks, private development banks, and stock
savings and loan associations), specialized government banks
(until 1996 when all had been absorbed into the commercial
banks group), and rural banks. The nonbank financial institutions
include investment houses, financing companies, securities dealers
and brokers, pawnshops, fund managers, lending investors,
nonstock savings and loan associations, pension funds and
insurance companies. The nonbank financial institutions are
under the supervision of either the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Central Bank or the Insurance Commission.
The banking system accounts for about three quarters of the
Philippine financial system, excluding private insurance
companies (Table 1). Within the banking sector, commercial banks
have increased their share of total bank assets during the period,
from less than three-quarters in the early 1980s to nearly five-
sixths in the early 1990s. Among nonbank financial institutions,
the government institutions, primarily the two social security
institutions (GSIS and SSS) and a home mortgage institution
(HMDF), became dominant, accounting for nearly two-thirds of
the total assets of nonbank financial institutions by 1995.
Financial deepening. The development of the financial sector
has not been smooth. Table 1 shows that the absolute level of
total assets of the system declined during the mid-1980s because
of the financial and economic crisis at that time. The two most
important government financial institutions, PNB and DBP, were
rehabilitated but with a much lower asset base. As the table
indicates, there was a significant decline in the ratio of total
assets of the financial sector (especially the banking sector) to
GNP during the early to mid-1980s. The share inched slowly
during the late 1980s but it was during the 1990s that the share
significantly picked up to recover to its 1980 level by 1995.TABLE 1 0o
Total Assets of the Financial System
(Amount in billion pesos; share in percent)
1980 1985 1987 1990 1995 1996
Institution Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share
I. Banking System 188.8 76.2a/ 395.2 78,6a/ 330.4 733 a/ 609.5 (76.1)a/ 1595.6 78.6 a/ 2109.5 82.13a/
Commercial Banks 138,4 (73,3)b/ 283.3 (71.7)b/ 274.5 (83.1)b/ 539.7 (88.5)b/ 1347.4 (84.4)b/ 1876.2 (88.94)b/
Thrift Banks 10.6 (5.6)b/ 15,1 (3.8)b/ 19.6 (5.9)b/ 37.6 (6.2)b/ 143.3 (9.0)b/ 185.1 (8.77)b/
Specialized Gov't Banks 34.2 (18.1)b/ 88,0 (22.3)b/ 26.3 (8,0)b/ 18.5 (3.0)b/ 68.2 (4.3)b/ 0.2 (0.01)b/
Rural Banks 5.6 (3,0)b/ 8,8 (2.2)b/ 10.0 (3,0)b/ 13.7 (2,2)b/ 36.7 (Z3) b/ 48.0 (Z28)b/
I]. Nonbank Financia| ,_
Institutions 58.9 23.8a/ 107_3 21.4a/ 121.4 26.9a/ 191.8 23.9a/ 434,4 21.4a/ 459.1 17.87a/
Government NBFI 20,1 (34.1)c/ 60.60 (56.5)c/ 67,0 (55.2)c/ 107_8 (56.2)c/ 277,2 (63.8)c/ 277.7 (60.49)c/ _.
Private NBF] 38,8 (65.9)c/ 46.70 (43.5)c/ 54.3 (44.7)e/ 84.0 (43.8)c/ 157.2 (36.2)c/ 181.4 (39.51) c/
Grand Total 247,7 502.5 451.8 801.3 2030.0 2568.6 O
Percent share to GNP 101.6 90.4 67.4 74,3 103.6 112.5 ._.
Notes: apercent share to grand total
bpercent share to banking system total
Cpercent share to NBFI total
Sources of Data: Central Bank Statistical Bulletin, I988 (for 1980, 1985, 1987) r"lt'rl
Central Bank Statistical Buttetin, 1995 (for 1990, 1995)
L'rl
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The pattern of development in total assets is also echoed in
the share of the financial sector to gross domestic product. At
current prices, the share of the sector was 3.9 percent in 1980,
dropping to 3.0 percent in 1985, and then inching back up to
4.0 percent in 1990. The share was about 4.2 percent in 1995
but this share rose significantly to 4.8 percent by 1997 (in the
first three quarters), reflecting the sharp expansion of the financial
sector during the past three years.
The extent of financial deepening is indicated in Table 2. The
real value of narrow money and broad money (with or without
deposit substitutes) expanded significantly during the late 1970s,
and, for broad money, into 1983. The levels declined during
1984-85 but recovered and continued expanding afterwards.
The economic crisis in 1993-95 resulted in some disintermediation
as indicated by the reduction in the shares of narrow and broad
moneys to GNP. It was not until 1989 when the M2/GNP ratio
recovered to the-peak obtained in the early 1980s; for the M3/
GNP ratio, the full recovery to earlier highs occurred only in
1993. The ratios rose significantly during the past three years to
reach 38 percent of GNP by 1996, reflecting the "boom" in the
financial sector. Nevertheless, despite the rise in the ratio of
broad money to GNP in recent years, it may be noted that the
shares as of the third quarter of 1997 for the Philippines are still
lower than the ratios for Indonesia, Thailand, Taiwan, and even
India in 1990 (White 1995).
An indication of the strengthening of the financial sector is
the secular reduction in the reliance of financial institutions for
sources of funds on borrowings, and their corresponding greater
emphasis on deposits. For example, commercial banks relied for
nearly one-fourth of their funds on borrowings during much of
the 1970s and early 1980s for only less than one-tenth in the
early 1990s. The decline in reliance on borrowings was
particularly drastic for rural banks, from more than 50 percent
of their funds in the 1970s to only about one-eighth in the early
1990s. This drop in the share of borrowings to total funds,
especially for rural banks andcommercial banks, is in contrast
to the sharp rise in the share of deposits as a source of funds for20 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
• TABLE2
Indicators of Financial Deepening, 1975-96
Real Value of Monetary
Aggregates* (At constant Percent Share to GNP
1988 prices; in billion pesos)
Year
Money Broad Domestic Money Broad Domestic
•. Supply Money Liquidity Supply Money Liquidity
1975 53.3 99.3 149.5 9.6 17.8 26.8
1976 57.1 117.9 169.4 9.6 19.8 28.5
1977 64.2 140.1 189.3 _ 10.3 22.5 30.4
1978 67.8 161.6 207.7 10.1 24.2 31.1
1979 64.2 154.9 195.9 9.2 22.3 28.2
1980 65.0 159.9 195.7 9.2 22.8 27.9
1981 60.0 16Z4 209.6 8.4 23.4 29.3
1982 54.4 182.2 ,220.6 7.5 25.1 30.4
1983 68.6 204.4 240.4 9.0 26.7 31.4
1984 : 47.2 155.7 171.4 6.6 21.9 24.1
1985 40.1 140.7 150.3 6.5 22.6 24.2 '
1986 47.9 156.6 162.1 7.2 23.4 24.2
1987 57.1 172.4 176.4 7.8 23.6 24.1
1988 59.7 195.9 198.4 7.5 24.7 25.1
1989 70.0 223.8 226.3 8.6 27.5 27.8
1990 69.5 232.i 234.6 8.3 27.6 27.9
1991 66.7 226.4 '228.4 8.0 27.3 27.5
1992 67.7 230.6 232.7 8.1 27.6 27.8
1993 75.1 268.5 269.4 8.9 31.9 32.0
1994 78.2 310.3 312.7 8.8 34.7 35.0
1995 88.0 359.6 362.6 9.4 38.6 38.9
1996 97.5 384.2 387.1 9.7 38.3 38.6
• Deflated by CPI (1988-100)
Sourcesof Data: PIDSData and Information ResourceProgram
BSP SelectedPhilippine Economic Indicators
' NSCB'National Income Accounts
the institutions; (Table 3). For commercial banks; the rise was
from less than one-half in the 1970s and early 1980s to about
two-thirds by the early 1990s. For rural banks, the rise in the
Share of deposits as a source of funds was from less than one-
third during the 1970s and early • 1980s to about three-fifths
during the early 1990s. Among the financial institutions, it is the
savings banks that have preponderantly relied on deposits forINTAL & LLANTO: FINANCIAL REFORM 21
TABLE 3
Share of Deposits to GNP and Total Funds By Institution
1975-95 (In percent)- • -
Share of Deposits to Total Funds
Share of Phil. Private Specl:d.
Deposits* Banking Comm'l Thrift Savings Dev't Rural Gov't
Year to GNP System Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks
III[[
1975 25.89 40.29 40.75 75.89 83.83 54.64 24.67 35.42
1976 27.49 43.13 45.68 75.97 86.66 55.90 28.16 28.74
1977 29.43 43.97 56.73 80.79 88.23 55.84 38.84 20.70
1978 32.64 44.08 48.37 82.39 90.19 54.82 32_01 18.75
1979 34.30 44.44 48.41 82.09 89.98 55.34 32.18 _18.68
1980 36.81 46.23 50.48 75.72 •83.18 47.79 30.75 20.85
1981 35.52 43.57 46.97 71.94 85.76 45.97 _31.64 24.81
1982 38.09 43.24 47.76 74.05 86.70 54.80 32.24 19.23
1983 39.17 42.96 48.53 69.40 80.54 53.61 33.54 12.89
1984 30.20 38.71 47.35 46.53 39.87 48.26 32.51 6.74
1985 29.57 42.36 51.57 68.74 82.76 53.26 35.10 8.13
1986 27.95 57.52 59.64 72.79 85.97 57.14 41.38 33.3i
1987 26.55 59.09 61.88 75.92' 87.04 61.50 46.67 21.94
1988 28.63 62.88 65.38 74.91 86.58 59.14 48.80 27.18
1989 31.72 62.27 64.25 74.83 83.86 56.24 50.99 23.12
1990 33.30 60.64 62.45 71.97 81.52 54.62 52.08 30.37
1991 33.70 62.42 64.99 71.55 79.30 53-05 54.82 32.49
1992 36.32 63.00 66.02 67.31 77.64 45.13 57.60 40.35
1993 43.29 64.83 67.85 67.89 75.42 52.15 60.19 48.30
1994 46.49 64.31 68.40 61.05 62.61 54.83 _63.09 41.51
1995 52.46 63.40 65.11 64.76 66.33 60.08 64.49 49.80
•Total deposit liabilities of the Philippine Financial System
Sources: Bangko Seneral ng Pilipinas, Philippine Financial System Factbook
NSCB National Income Accounts
their funds, accounting for at least three-quarters (more often,
more than four-fifths) of total funds during much of the past
two decades.
The rising importance of dep_)sits as a source of funds for the
banking institutions .is reflected in the rising real value _of total
deposits and in _the share of deposits to GNP during the past
two decades. With the exception of the decline in the real value
of deposits during 1984-85, the real value of total deposits has
increased over time and the share of total deposits to GNP has
correspondingly increased secularly: from 33 percent in 1978 to
38 percent in 1982, 27 percent in 1987, 43 percent in 1993 and22 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
53 percent in 1995. The sharp rise in the ratio of total deposits to
GNP during 1994-95 is worth noting because this coincided with
the liberalization in bank branching and entry into the banking
sector, the sharp .expansion in the use of banking technologies,
especially automated teller machines, and the greater variety of
offerings of financial products in addition to the improvement in
the economy which saw an increase in the saving rate. The
rising financialization of savings is also indicated by the rising
ratio of the increase in total deposits to the gross saving. This
ratio has increased from a range of 33-35 percent during 1988 to
1992 to an average of 54 percent during 1993-95.
Expansion of j_nancial institutions. The significant pickup in
the total assets of the financial system during the 1990s is also
reflected in the substantial rise in the number of offices of the
financial institutions. The number of offices hovered between
5,290 and 6,000 during 1980-86, rose to 7,349 by 1990 and
around 10,000 in 1993 but jumped by more than 60 percent in
the 1990s to reach 16,314 by June 1997 (Table 4). The sharpest
increase in absolute level occurred during 1994-96 in response to
the liberalization in bank branching, the opening up of new
banks, and the improvement in the economy. The rise in the
number of offices is across-the-board on all forms of banking
and nonbank financial institutions. However, drawing from the
pattern of growth of banking offices by region, the financial
institutions have' been expanding more than proportionately in
the Metro Manila area, the fast growing Region IV (specifically
the so-called CALABARZON area), and Central Visayas
(especially Cebu). The share of Metro Manila to the total number
of banking offices increased from about 30.5 percent in 1984 to
34.5 percent in 1995 while the share of Region IV increased
from 14.1 percent in 1984 to 16.0 percent in 1995, Central
Visayas" share in 1995 was 6.7 percenk up from 6.1 percent in
1984.
The sharp expansion of the banking system in the past two
years has been bolstered by the expansion in the presence of
foreign banks in the domestic banking system as a result of the
limit_ opening up of the domestic banking system to new foreign
• . :. !
JTABLE 4
Number of Offices By Institutional Group, !976-97
End of period
1976 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 198_ 1986 1987 1988 1989 1998 1991 1992 1993 1934 1999 1996 1997_¢
F_ System
I-leadO4Kces 2466 2554 2509 260i 2767 2788 3347 3697 3904 4006 4192 4498 4627 3134 5648 6163 7458 7746
AllOffices • 5004 5290 5401 3674 $838 3637 5979 6349 6805 7135 7349 7855 8909 9938 11073 1243815486 16314 ""
8_dnS Inmtu_
J'ked_ " 1209 1214 1132 1122 1098 1053 1024 994 982 962 940 919 920 912 920 937 961 987
AftOffices :3419 3661 3718 3861 3829 3632 3614 3547 3562 3_88 3638 3739 4296 4657 5096 5569 6332 6745 _
N O_k_s . 31 32 33 34 34 34 30 30 29 29 29 30 31 33 33 34 46 49 52
AMCXfk_ 1107 1501 1738 1496 1904 1922 i744 1766 17"27 1746 1765 1813 192"3 2381 2694 2924 3221 3647 3809
Tbrm BJmks
Hmdollk_ 95 144 140 137 136 121 118 116 112 110 106 103 101 98 97 100 99 108 113
AUOffices 392 671 '639 677 704 650 671 663 658 664 673 653 663 718 780 821 925 1171 1341
Prfvste Dev't Banks
Headoflk'es 33 43 44 43 43 43 43 43 42 41 41 40 38. 37 37 37 37 39 40
All Offices 90 154 182 202 218 209 225 213 205 205 206 211 202 218 250 265 310 432 334
Savings k Mortgage Banks
Head offwes 10 9 8 8 8 7 7 8 8 8 7 7 7 8 12 12 19 24
AllOffwes 266 189 195 209 211 226 231 243 250 277 270 28,5 316 334 347 367 428 472
Rural .BmW, s "•
.Headof&'es 80,5 1030 1038 958 949 940 904 873 850 840 824 804 784 787 780. 784 790 804 822
• All_ 887 1165 1168 1103 1152 1137 1117 1083 1058 1048 1043 1043 1063 1140 1195 1274 1346 1514 .1595Table 4 (CONTINUED)
I_titation 1976 1980 1981 1982 1980 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1990 1994 1995 1996 1997'/
Specialized Gov't Banks
Head offices 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 O h/ 0b/
All Offices' 73 92 116 97 97 100 100 100 104 104 105 127 I42 184 205 225 251 0s/ 0b/
Non-Bank Fin'l intermediaries
Head offices 1056 1178 1260 1295 1398 1590 1621 1897 2271 2631 2860 2984 3190 3707 4222 4728 5226 6497 6759
AUOffices 1259 1475 1549 1601 1731 1949 1922 2283 2719 3158 3465 3629 3954 4612 5282 5977 6849 9154 9569 O
C t=md
aasof June .
bSpecialized Government Bankshave been consolidated as Commercial Banks. Development Bankof the Philippines became s commercial bank on .
February 1996 while Al-Amanah [slamic Investment Banko_the Philippines became a commercial bank on _une 1996, O











banks. Whereas there were only 4 foreign full service banks (not
representative offices or offshore banking units) in operation in
the country for much of the postwar period, the Controlled liber-
alization of entry of foreign banks since 1994 has led to the
increase in the number of banks operating in the country to 17
by the third quarter Of 1997. The share of foreign banks to the
total assets of the banking system, which declined secularly from
10.2 percent in 1984 to 6.1 percent in 1995, jumped significantly
to 14.3 percent by September 1997.
Financial sector stability and competitive environment. One
very important effect of the series of increases in minimum capital
requirements imposed on banks during the past several years is
the relatively robust capital-adequacy ratios compared to the
BIS (Bank of international Settlements) requirement. The capital-
adequacy ratio defined as the ratio of net worth to risk assets,
stayed within the range of 16.9 percent to 20.2 percent from
1992 to June 1997 (Table 5). This ratio is twice the BIS requirement
of 8 percent. It is likely that a major reason why the Phihppine
banking system has been able so far to weather the current
currency and financial turmoil in the region is the robust capital-
adequacy ratio of the Philippine banking system.
The rising minimum capital requirements for banks is in
principle a barrier to entry. For sometime also,• the predominant
bias of the Central •Bank was for a few but large banks.
Nevertheless, as TabIe 4 indicates, the higher minimum capital
requirement was not an effective entry barrier inasmuch as.the
number of commercial banks shot up from 31-34 during much
of the 1980s and early 1990s to 46 in 1995 and 52 as of June
1997.
There are also some indications that the liberalization in the
entry of banks has increased the competition for deposits. Table
5 shows the share of the five largest commercial banks to the
total deposits of commercial banks, either including or excluding
PNB. Including PNB, the share• did not rise significantly over
time; excluding PNB, the share rose dramatically. The rise in the
share of the top five banks, excluding PNB, in total deposits
during the 1980s is likely the result primarily of the "flight to26 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
TABLE5
Capital .Adequacy Ratio and
Share of Five Larsest Commercial Banks to
Total Deposit of Commercial Banks
(In percent)
Year Capital-Ade_luacy Share of Five Larsest Banks
"Ratio_
Incl. PNB Excl. PNB
1975 ... 51.1 22.3
1980 ... 46.9 27.4
1985 .., 4&7 39.0 •
1990 ..,. ,53_7. 44.0
1991 .... .. 52.7 40.2
1992 20.24 52.0 39.8
1993 • 19.i9 52.8 39.6
1994 •18.55 52.0 42.3 •
1995 18.79 50.3 41.6
1996 16.84
aNet Worth/RiskAssets; ratiosfor the whole bankingsystem
bas of June
Casof thirdquarter
Sources: PNB PhilippineCommercialBankingSystem Quarterly
Report BangkoSentralng Pilipinas
quality" by depositors during the period of financial, economic
and political uncertainty in the 1980s. However, what is
noteworthy is that the concentration of deposits in the top. five
banks, either including or excluding PNB, has been declining
since 1994, a period of liberalized bank entry and branching as
well as a period of economic expansion. Indeed, the increased
competition for deposits in recent years is reflected not only in
the reduction in deposit concentration but in the competition in
the provision of deposit and financial services, as reflected in the
expansion of automatic teller machines (ATMs), innovative
banking services like phone banking, and the introduction of
dollar-denominated ATMs for depositors in banks" foreign •
currency deposit units (FCDU).INTAL &LLANT(_. FINANCIAL REFORM 27
The reduction in bank deposit concentration is worth noting
in the light of indications that there are economies of scale but
not economies of scope in banking in the Philippines (Okuda
1997). In addition, earlier studies (e.g., Lamberte and Llanto
1993) indicate that bank concentration has a bearing on the
level of the bank spread, suggesting some element of monopoly
power. It is likely that the liberalization of ban_kentry in 1994,
especially of a number of major international banks which
brought with them solid reputations, encouraged greater deposit-
taking to banks other than the top five.
The pattern over time of the shares of savings deposits and
time deposits to total deposits by banking institutions is also
worth noting. For example, commercial banks relied increasingly
on savings deposits during 1986 to 1994 when the share of
savings deposits to total deposits rose from 50.8 percent in 1986
to 68 percent in 1994; however, this share declined significantly
during the past three years, ending at 59.1 percent as of June
1997. The share of time deposits to total deposits of commercial
banks has correspondingly declined and increased over the same
period. In contrast, the thrift banks (savings banks and private
development banks) have increasingly relied on savings deposits
for their funds, i.e., from about 65 percent and 48 percent for
savings banks and private development banks, respectively, in
1986 to the low 80s for both types in 1996-97. As a result, the
share of savings banks and private development banks to the
total savings deposits in the whole banking system increased,
while that of commercial banks correspondingly decreased.
Specifically, the shares of savings banks and private development
banks rose from 5.4 percent and 1.9 percent, respectively, in
1986 to 7.3 percent and 5.3 percent, respectively, by June 1997.
In contrast, the share of commercial banks in total savings
declined from 87.8 percent in 1986 to 84.3 percent by June 1997
at the same time that commercial banks increasingly locked up
the banking sector's time deposit liabilities during the period.
The apparent niching of the banking institutions is likely a
result in part of increased banking competition, with the thrift
banks relying on the retail market and small depositors while28 JOURNAL 'OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
the commercial banks increasingly focused on the more affluent
depositors through time deposit offerings. At the same time,
however, the growing reliance of banks on time deposits meant
that the interest differential between the banks' lending rates
and deposit (increasingly time) rates narrowed. As Table 6 shows,
the differential between the average lending rate and the time
deposit rate is much lower than the differential between the
average lending rate and the saving rate. With the narrowing of
the interest differential over time, there appears to be a growing
pressure on commercial banks to become "universal" banks in
order that a larger share of the banks' income would come from
allied services and investments allowed to universal banks.
Commercial banks have also relied significantly on fee-based
"off balance sheet" activities like trust accounts. Philippine banks
are considered more diversified than their counterparts in a
number of countries in the region, although as Okuda (1997)
notes, the substantial share of noninterest income to total income
of banks in the late 1980s can be explained in part as due to the
issuance of high priced Treasury bills because of high fiscal deficits
during the late 1980s.
Table 6 shows three subperiods of high interest rates during
the 1980-97 period. These are the 1981-85 subperiod, the 1989-
92 subperiod and the subperiod starting in 1997 and still
ongoing. The first subperiod corresponds to the financial and
economic crisis of the early and mid 1980s, the second subperiod
corresponds to the regime of monetary and fiscal tightening in
response to the large fiscal deficits, and the third one stems from
the ongoing regional currency and financial turmoil starting in
mid-1997. The movement of interest rates and the changes in
the economy impacted on the loan behavior of banks. Table 7
presents the term structure of loans outstanding of commercial
banks. The table shows that the share of short-term loans to
total loans outstanding declined during the crisis period of the
early 1980s, rose during the 1989-92 period, and then declined
during the economic recovery period of 1993-95. The decline in
the share of short-term loans appears inconsistent with usual
banking behavior during a period of financial and economicINTAL & LLANTO: FINANCIAL REFORM 29
TABLE 6
Interest Rate Structure, 1975-97
{In percent)
Nominal Interest Rates
Bank " T-Bill Interbank
Manila Av_age All Matu- Call , Savings Time Inflation
Year Rcf. Rate Lending rllles Loan Deposit Deposit Rate
Ra_¢ Rates
1975 ..- 12 to14 ...... 6.0 ... 9.7
1976 ... 12 to 16 ...... 7.0 _.. 9.4
1977 ... 12.8 ...... 7,0 .., 7.5
1978 ... 12.7 ...... 7.0 ... 17,5
1979 ... 12.7 ...... 9.0 ... 18,2
1980 ... 13,5 .,. 11.9 9,0 .., 13,1
1981 ... 17,1 ,,, 14.9 9_8 16.7 10,2
1982 19.2 18.2 ,.. 12.2 9.8 15.8 10.2
1983 15.0 19.3 ... 16.7 9.7 15.3 10.0
1984 22.2 26.7 ... 28.1 9.9 24.2 50.3
1985 21.1 28.2 ... 16.2 10.8 21.8 23.4
1986 12,3 17.3 ,.. 12.5 8.0 14.8 -0.4
1987 9.4 13.3 12.9 12.0 4.5 9.8 3.0
1988 12.4 16.0 15,5 14.2 4.1 13.4 8.9
1989 16.0 19.5 19.7 15.4 6.2 17.0 12.2
1990 21-3 24.3 24.7 14.8 10.8 20.2 14_2
1991 17.8 23,5 22_5 15.7 11.0 18.5 183
1992 14,8 19.4 17,0 16_7 10.6 14.1 8.9
1993 11.3 14.6 13,1 13,7 8.3 10.4 7.6
1994 11.6 15.0 13.8 13.4 8.0 10.7 9.0
1995 10.0 14.6 12.5 12,1 8.0 9.3 8.1
1996 11.7 14.8 13,0 12.6 8,0 11.5 8.4
1997" 14.9 18.2 16,1 15,7 5.3,I
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Table 6 (CONTINUED)...
Real Interest Rates
Bank T-Bill _ Weighted Weighted
Manila Av_ase All Mah_ Call Savinss Time Average Real Ave.
Year ReL Rate Lending s/tles Loan Deposit Depa_ Int, Rate*" Int. Rate
Rate Rates
1975 ............ -3.7 .,. 13.6 3,9
1976 ............ -2.4 ... 13.0 3.6
1977 ... 5.3 ...... -0.5 ... 12.6 5.1
1978 .,. -4.8 ...... -10.5 ,,. 107 -6_8
1979 .... 5.5 ...... -9.2 ,.. 12.8 -5,4
1980 ._, 0.4 ... -1.2 -4.1 ... 13.3 0.1
1981 ... 6.9 .,, 4.7 -0.4 6.5 15.7 5.4
1982 9.0 8.0 ... 2.0 -0.4 5,6 14,2 4,0
1983 5.0 9.3 ... 6.7 -0.3 5.3
1984 -28.1 -2.3.6 ... -22.2 -40.4 -26.1 27.2 -23.1
1985 -2.3 4-8 ,,. '-7.2 -12,6 -i.6 20.6 -2.8
1986 12.7 17.7 .,. 12.9 8.4 15.2 13.3 13.7
1987 6.4 10,3 9.9 9-0 1,5 6.8 11,1 8.1
1988 3.5 7.1 6.6 5,3 -4.8 4.5 13,4 4.5
1989 3.8 7.3 7.5 3,2 -6_0 4.8 15.7 3.5
1990 7.1 10.1 10.5 0.6 -3.4 6.0 18,0 3.8
1991 -0,9 4.8 3.8 -3.0 -7,7 -0.2 17,6 -1.1
1992 5.9 10.5 8.1 7.8 1,7 5.2 15,7 6.8
1993 3.7 7.0 5.5 6.1 0.7 2,8 12.6 5.0
1994 2.6 6.0 4.8 4.4 -1.0 1-7 11.0 2.0
1995 1,9 6.5 4,4 4.0 -0.1 1-2 13.3 5.2
1996 3,3 6.4 4.6 4.2 -0.4 3.1
1997" 9.6 12.9 10.8 10.4
... no available data
" September
** Based on Money Market Transactions
Sources: Tan(1997), "Financial Liberalization, Savings Mobilization and Financial
Innovations," paper prepared for the Symposium in Honor of Dr. Sicat and Dr.
EncamaciOn, September.
BSP SPEI, October 1997,
BSP Statistical Bulletin, various yeats,INTAL & LLANTO: FINANCIAL REFORM 31
crisis as in the early 1980s. However, this is largely statistical
because banks actually reduced their lending activities during
the period, with short-term loans necessarily providing the largest
room for adjustment. During the period 1989-91, the high
Treasury bill rates used to mop up liquidity and finance the
large fiscal deficits encouraged banks to focus on short-term
lending given the high short-term rates and the likely reduction
in demand for long-term loans due to the economic recession.
The 1993-95 period suggests that banks responded favorably, in
terms of a rising share of long-term loans, to an economic
environment aimed at improving macroeconomic stability in a
growing economy.
Nevertheless, as Table 7 shows, commercial banks are lending
preponderantly in the short term (i.e., one year or less). This is
not surprising given the source of funding of banks, the
fluctuations in the economy and in the interest rate, and the
problems of asymmetric information that lead banks to lend in
the short-term to put borrowers on a leash for effective
monitoring. In this light, the development of the country's
securities market during the past few years provides an important
if volatile complement to the banking system. The Philippine
stocl, market grew significantly during the 1990s, with market
capi_alization as a ratio of GNP increasing from 15 percent in
1990 to 80 percent in 1994 and 93 percent in 1996 (Table 8). The
magnitude of capital raised through the stOck market has been
substantial especially during 1994-95. In fact, the capital raised
through the stock market during 1994-95 comprised 83 percent
of the increase in the total loans outstanding and 708 percent of
the increase in the long-term loans outstanding of commercial
banks during the same period. Considering that capital raised in
the stock market is largely comprised of long-term funds provided
to the issuer, the figures above indicate that indeed the stock
market can be a major source of funding. However, as Table 8
indicates, the stock market is highly volatile, reflecting the
thinness of the market and the strong dependence of the local
stock market on foreign investors. The sharp fall in stock prices
and the turnover during the past few months in the face of _.he32 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
TABLE 7
Loans Outstanding of Commercial Banks By Maturity, 1980-95
(In billion pesos)
Tetal Percent Share to Total Loans
Year Outstanding
Loans Short term* Intermediate Long term
1980 77,20 78.1 10.0 11.9
1981 86.51 73.4 17.3 9.3
1982 98.24 69.0 18.1 12,9
1983 115.39 69,0 15,2 15.8
1984 120,36 60.6 24.2 15.1
1985 91.83 65.9 17.0 17,0
1986 88.33 69.2 17.9 12.9
1987 101.11 71.5 22.6 5.9
1988 126.62 71.0 21.0 8.1
1989 165.86 74.7 19.2 6.2
1990 199,65 80.0 16.6 3.4
1991 144.31 78.3 16,3 5,4
1992 256.32 77.7 18.5 3.8
1993 432.83 74.4 14.5 11.0
1994 542.80 70.5 17.4 12.1
1995 737.26 70.6 16.9 12.4
1996 1120.26 69.5 18.2 12.3
Jun-97 1277.83 70.1 17.4 12.5
* Including Demand
Note: Short-term _ 1 year or leas; Medium-term _ more than 1 year to 5 years;
Long-term -- more than 5 years
Source: Lamberte and Llanto (1996)
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TABLE8
Stock Market Capitalization and .Prices, 1986-96
_ air .f
Market Market Capital Stock Price
Year Capitalization Capitalization Raised Index*
(in million pesos) as % of GNP (in million pesos)
1986 41214 6.91 734 ...
1987 61108 9.11 1261 813.17
1988 88591 11.19 3060 841.65
1989 261022 28.55 4897 1104.57
1990 161219 14.95 18537 651.78
1991 297743 23.58 25991 1151.87
1992 391231 28.24 22143 1256.87
1993 1088820 72.57 36252 3196.08
1994 1386464 79.83 149381 2785.81
1995 1545728 78.55 102241 2594.18
1996 2121059 92.91 122523 3170.56
*CompositeIndex; annualclosing prices
Sources: Lamberteand Llan_ (1996)
Philippine StockExchange
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regional currency and economic turmoil highlights the
vulnerability of the securities market to overall macroeconomic
conditions as well as the sentiments of foreign investors.
In summary, the Philippine financial sector has recovered
from the crisis of the early 1980s towards financial deepening,
stronger presence of foreign financial institutions in the domestic
financial market, and greater reliance on deposit mobilization as
a source of funds for the banking sector. This recovery and
deepening is coincident with the reform process in the economy
in general and in the financial sector in particular. However, as
the past decade shows, and as the ongoing currency and financial
turmoil in the region brings out, financial institutions like banks
and the stock market are strongly influenced by the
macroeconomic environment. At the same time, financial
institutions, as key conduits of capital flows within the country
and between the country and the rest of the world, help shape
significantly the country's macroeconomy.34 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
IV. FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION, CAPITAL FLOWS AND
THE MACROECONOMY
The liberalization of the capital account of many developing
countries like the Philippines through the liberalization of the
foreign exchange market, substantially widens the arena of
financial intermediation but at the same time poses many difficult
issues of prudential regulations and macroeconomic (including
exchange rate) policies. For example, capital market liberalization
opens up a potentially huge supply of funds for domestic firms
to tap. However, only few large (and likely internationally
known) domestic firms can be expected to be able to directly tap
foreign capital markets. The more likely route is either through
foreign borrowing or bond flotation of domestic banks (or other
domestic financial insti_tion) abroad which the banks can then
lend to local firms or through the domestic stock market where
foreign investors can invest. The route through the domestic
banks can lead to currency mismatches and may make domestic
banks and other financial institutions vulnerable to exchange
rate shocks. In addition, the predominant role of banking
institutions in the country's financial system implies that banks
are also indirectly affected by capital flows directly sourced from
abroad by domestic firms when the firms deposit such funds
with the banks. Thus, the soundness of the banking sector and
the integrity of bank credit decisions are very important
ingredients in managing capital flows (Folkerts-Landau et al.
1995).
Similarly, the thinness and lack of liquidity of the domestic
stock market implies that foreign funds coming into the country
or getting out of the country wield tremendous impact on the
prices of the domestic securities. Moreover, the international-
ization of institutional funds management has increased the flow
of funds that are Sensitive to changes in sentiment about the
economic prospects of recipient countries (Folkerts-Landau et al.
1995). As such, the domestic equities market and the whole
economy become vulnerable to sudden shifts in market sentiment
as the recent regional economic turmoil has shown. In addition,
through whichever route foreign capital comes into the country,INTAL&LLANTO:FINANCIALREFORM 35
surges in capital flows have significant impact on monetary and
fiscal policy as well as on the country's exchange rate. The policy
responses of the recipient country ultimately affect foreign
sentiments on the economic prospects of the country, thereby
making the foreign community an additional "public" that
macroeconomic managers in the recipient countries would have
to take into consideration when they devise their policies. Thus,
the liberalization of the capital account and the greater reliance
on foreign capital flows in recipient countries have significantly
changed the parameters of macroeconomic policy making and
financial regulations in the recipient country, simply because
capital flows do not only offer potentially large benefits but also
pose substantially higher risks to the financial sector and the
whole economy unless they are managed well.
Evolution of capital flows to the Philippines. As a recipient
of significant capital flows, the Philippines is a latecomer in East
Asia. While APEC developing countries have hogged the limelight
as major destinations of international capital flows during the
past decade, such flows have largely gone to China, Thailand,
Malaysia and Indonesia. A key reason for the country's laggard
status is because the Philippines was largely cut off from the
international capital market resulting from the debt moratorium
of 1983. Indeed, as Table 9 suggests, the process of the Philippine
re-entry into the international capital market started with debt
restructurings and debt conversions. It was only in the 1990s
that the country was able to float bonds and (on a limited scale)
international equity issues. The Philippines, alone among the
ASEAN countries, has yet to get back to an investment grade
credit rating by reputable international credit rating agencies.
Nevertheless, the country's attractiveness for capital inflows
appears to have been improving over time during the 1990s. The
changes in the structure of foreign liabilities of the country are
suggestive of the improving access of the Philippines in the
international capital market (Table 9). The level of foreign
indebtedness of the public nonbanking sector (i.e., the
government) has been declining since 1994 while those of the
banking and private nonbanking sectors have increasedTABLE 9
Balance of Payments, 1985-96
(In percent of GDP)
Item 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Current account -0.33 3.20 -1.34 -1.03 -0.34 -5.81 -1.92 -1.62 -5.54 -4.60 -3.47 -4.50
Capital account 6.00 0.96 2.14 2.60 0.45 5.60 6.54 4.43 5.24 7.41 4.32 9.40
Direct investment 0.15 0.49 1.09 2.60 0.13 1.20 1.17 1.27 1.59 2.01 1.61 1.46
Portfolio investment -0.10 -0.02 -0.11 0.01 0.07 -0.11 0.28 0.12 -0.10 0.42 1.28 -0.20
Other long-term (net) 7.06 2.84 1.78 -1.54 0.15 0.87 3,02 2.12 1.38 2.16 1.55 3.20
Other short-term {net) -1,12 -2.35 -0.63 1.53 0.10 3.65 2.07 1.80 2.36 2.82 -0.11 4.94
Change in gross
international reserves 0.57 4.68 -1,51 -4.63 4,97 -0.75 5.47 1.41 1.07 1.86 0.86 4.76
Errors and omissions 2,08 0.11 -0_43 1.11 0.09 0.98 1.29 -0.68 0.15 0.25 -1.85 -1.33
in commercial Change
banks' NFA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 -0_40 0.87 -1.01 0.73 1.76 5.63
1--4
Peso Conversion of FCDUs 0.01 0.01 0.01 0_01 0.02 0.01 0,02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.07 Z
>
Overall surplus or deficit (-) 5.66 4.16 0.80 1.57 0.11 -0.21 4.62 2.81 -0.31 2.81 0.85 4.90
Memorandum Items: O
Workers" remittances 2.26 2.33 2.44 2.31 0.23 2.72 3.64 4.19 4,18 4.69 5.22 5.14
Current account less U_
workers" remittances -2.59 0.86 -3.78 -3.34 -0.58 -8.54 -5,56 -5.81 -9.73 -9.29 -8.69 -9.64
Capital account with "0
workers" remittances 8.25 3.30 4.58 4,90 0.68 8.33 10.19 8.63 9.42 12.10 9.54 14.53
Of which: Other short-term
workers' remittances 1.14 -0.02 1.81 3_84 0.34 6.37 5,72 6.00 6.55 7.51 5.11 10.08
Sources of Data: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas _t _
PIDS Data and Information Resource Program
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significantly. What is noteworthy is the sharp rise in foreign
liabilities of the private sector, especially the private commercial
banks, during 1996 and the first half of 1997. This raises the
issue as to whether (a) the macroeconomic and incentive
considerations that led to the recent financial crises in Thailand
and Indonesia were also present or developing in the Philippines,
and (b) the private sector borrowing binge internationally was
just nipped in the bud by the onset of the currency crisis in the
region.
The balance of payments of the Philippines is presented in
Table 10 and Figure 1. The current account deficit as a ratio of
GDP, although lower than those of Thailand and Malaysia, is
not negligible and was higher than those of Chile and Colombia
in recent years. The capital account surplus was larger than the
current account deficit such that there has been a continual
increase in the international reserves since 1990. The financing
of the current account deficit has changed somewhat during the
past few years. Direct investment arose primarily from debt
conversions during the early 1990s and privatization proceeded
especially during 1994 and 1995. Portfolio investments have been
inconsistent on a net basis, although the level of gross inflows
rose tremendously in recent years. Medium and long-term loans
have remained as the more important source of financing than
foreign direct investment. What is most striking, however, is the
sharp rise in short-term capital inflow in 1996, primarily because
of the increase in the net foreign assets of private commercial
banks. This was largely caused by the sharp rise in their foreign
currency deposits, from a level of $9.1 billion in 1995 to $14.5
billion in 1996, although a number of local banks also borrowed
abroad mainly in terms of floating, rate certificates of deposits
(FRCDs). 4 The bulk of the foreign currency deposits was
considered to be owned by Filipinos and therefore somewhat
4. For example, five top private commercial private banks floated FRCDs
amounting to $510 miUion. Moody's has recently downgraded the ratings of the
FRCDs of the five local banks along with the dollar debts of other banks in China,
Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand as a result of the currency turmoil
(Business World, January 19, 1998, p. 15).TABLE I0
External Debt Restructuring, Capital Issues and Foreign Exchange Liabilities
In billion US dollars)
Total Foreign Exchange Liabilities
Medium- Debt Inter-
Year and Long- Conver- Bond national Total Banking Commer- Private
term Debt sious d Issues Equity (a) + (b) + (c) System cial Banks Commer- Public Private




1990 1.34 b/ 0.38 28.55 7.81 2.32 1.71 16.96 3.79
1991 4.47 c/ 0.49 0.08 29.96 7.47 2.t4 1.80 18.45 4.04 0
1992 0.38 0.02 0.33 30.93 4.21 1.91 1.45 21.75 4.98
Z
1993 0.35 1.27 0.56 34.28 2.40 1.12 0.52 26.58 5.30
1994 0.18 1.31 0.30 37.08 3.03 2.17 0.98 27.19 6.86
1995 0.25 e/ 0.38 e/ 37.78 4.19 2.98 2.00 26.34 7.25
1996 41.88 8.63 7,22 5.38 24.13 9.11
1997 f/ 44,81 10.89 9,08 7,04 23.06 10.86
aBy year of agreement in prmcipte
bFace value of debt extinguished in buyback "_
CFinancing packages involving debt and debt-service reduction
dFace value of debt converted under official ongoing schemes. Figures do not include large-scale, one-off cash buybacks and
debt exchanges.
eFirst and second quarters only 0
f As of June 1997
Sources: IMF World Economic and Financial Surveys {November 1995)
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more stable than the short-term foreign borrowings that other
Southeast Asian banks in Thailand and Indonesia resorted to,
for example (Folkerts-Landau et al. 1995). Nevertheless,
considering that the commercial bank loans from their foreign
currency deposit units did not all go to exporters and fully hedged
firms, the sharp increase in foreign exchange liabilities of the
private commercial banks in 1995 and 1996 increased the
vulnerability of the country's banking system to the recent
currency turmoil.
The Philippines relies significantly on the remittances of
Filipino workers working abroad. The officially recorded amount
of workers' remittances reached more than 5 percent of GDP in
1995 and 1996. Workers' remittances are recorded under the
nonmer-chandise trade account; they can also be viewed as a
relatively more permanent source of financing of the current
account deficit net of the remittances. To some extent, the
pressure for appreciation of the peso is linked to the rise in the
value of workers' remittances into the country, thereby resulting
in a mild form of Dutch Disease. Table 10 shows the implications
on the level of current account deficit and the capital account
surplus depending on how the remittances are put in the balance
of payments.
The composition of the foreign capital inflow has a bearing
on the sustainability of the flows. Foreign direct investments are
generally viewed to be the most ideal source of finance because
of the correlative technology, managerial and marketing impacts
on the recipient country. Long-term loans are also preferred
because they are more untied and flexible. Portfolio capital is
generally viewed to be riskier and more sensitive to the
macroeconomic policy regime and environment in a country.
Despite the risks, portfolio capital has become the most important
source of foreign capital in the world. In addition, portfolio
capital can turn largely long term if the macroeconomic
environment is stable and the growth of the economy is
sustainable. The macroeconomic challenges in managing portfolio
capital flows are substantial partly because there is an element
of herd behavior in international portfolio capital flows and theINTAL&LLANTO:FINANCIALREFORM 41
magnitude of such flows is large internationally. Nevertheless,
precisely because portfolio capital is a potentially important
source of foreign capital, it is important that the structural,
institutiorlal and policy foundations of the macroeconomy are
continuously improved in order that portfolio capital can be
harnessed well for economic growth.
The evolution of the composition of the Philippines' balance
of payments points to some reasons why the country has not
been as hard hit as Thailand by the recent currency turmoil. The
country has relied more on medium and long-term loans and
foreign direct investment than on portfolio capital to finance its
current account deficits. The Philippines has not attracted a
huge net inflow of portfolio capital so far. This is not the result
of a deliberate policy but rather of not having been the "darling"
of the foreign investors. Nevertheless, as the 1996 numbers
suggest, and considering the still considerable impact of the
regional currency crisis on the Philippine currency and financial
markets, there is apparently large scope for further improvement
of the country's macroeconomic and financial institutions,
regulations and policies.
Capital flows, banking and macroeconomic policy. In recent
years, monetary aggregates in the Philippines expanded faster
than the gross national product, providing a measure of financial
deepening in the country (see Table 2). A question arises as to
whether capital inflows have a large bearing on this development
and whether such financial expansion is "excessive" enough to
bring its own dynamic of future crisis. Related to the financial
deepening has been the rise in the money multiplier s in recent
years, from a range of mainly 2.5 to 2.8 during 1978-93 to above
3 by 1994 and reaching 3.34 in 1996 (Figure 2a). The increase in
the money multiplier is linked to the significant reductions in the
reserves-to-deposit ratio and the currency-to-deposit ratio (Figure
2b). The reduction in the reserves-to-deposit ratio is the result of
the reduction in the reserve requirement from 24 percent in
1993 to 15 percent in 1995 and 14 percent in early 1997. The
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reduction in the currency-to-deposit ratio may have resulted in
part from the significant increase in the use of automated teller
machines and the growth of credit cards in recent years (see
Paderanga 1995). It may be noted that the increase in the money
multiplier happened at the same time that the inflation rate
dropped secularly in the past few years.
The experience of a number of Southeast Asian countries
and Korea is that the periods of large net capital inflows were
associated with rapid expansion in the banking sector, in both
their foreign liabilities, deposits and domestic lending (Folkerts-
Landau et al. 1995). The Philippine experience in the past three
years seems to indicate a similar trend (Table 11). The sharp rise
in foreign liabilities of banks in 1996 contributed to the sharp
rise in loans and advances to the private sector and the total
assets of the banking system. Thus, it is apparent that the
soundness of the banks' credit decisions has a large bearing on
whether the capital flows will eventually result in a robust
economy or eventually undermine the growth process.
A particular concern is the extent of total loans granted to
industries that are prone to asset bubbles, especially the real
estate, as well as to the nontraded sector, in the Philippines, the
ratio of real estate loans to total loans outstanding of commercial
banks averaged 4.7 percent during 1994-96 as against 3.8 percent
during 1989-92. In a special survey of 25 sample banks in March
1996, the Central Bank found that the average share of real
estate loans was 9.2 percent, although the ratio for an individual
bank in the sample went as high as 28.6 percent. The sample
banks also held commercial papers of real estate companies
amounting to only 0.5 percent of the combined assets of the
sample banks. Finally, the sample banks' equity investment in
real estate companies amounted to 5.1 percent of the total equity
investments of the sample banks. Overall, the combined loans
and equity exposure of the sample banks to the real estate sector
amounted to about 52 percent of the unimpaired capital of the
sample banks (BSP 1996).
The average ratio for the Philippines appears to be comparable
to .Thailand's 9.4 percent share to total commercial banks' bills,44 "JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
TABLE 11
Indicators of Banking* Activity, 1980-97
(In percent of GDP)
Total Investment
Total Total Loan5 and in Securities Foreign Foreign
Year Assets Deposits Advances Assets Liabilities
to Private Govern- Private
Sector ment
1980 56,8 30.7 30.9 2.2 3.3 7,3 15.9
1981 58,5 29,0 32.4 2.4 3.1 7.1 13_8
1982 60.2 30.0 32.7 3.4 2,5 7.6 15.1
1983 69.5 32.3 36.3 3.8 2.3 7.8 19.0
1984 57.1 26.2 23.7 3.1 3.1 8.3 17.9
1985 51.9 26.0 19.4 2.5 3.0 7.2 13.9
1986 43.5 24,0 13.9 3.6 2.1 7.3 9.5
1987 42.1 23.0 15.5 3,4 1.3 8.1 9.4
1988 42.8 24.9 15,0 4.5 1.1 8.8 9.4
1989 45.4 27.3 16.8 5.6 1.1 8.6 9.6
1990 50.3 29.0 18.9 5.1 1.6 10.1 12-2
1991 48.1 29.4 17.6 4.6 3.6 8.0 10-6
1992 51.1 31.6 20.2 6.1 2.4 8.4 13.1
1993 58.6 37,8 25.7 5.3 2.9 9.0 15.0
1994 62.5 40.7 29.1 7.3 2,6 8.7 16.2
1995 70.7 45.8 37.2 7.8 2.8 8.8- 19.7
1996 85.4 51.0 49.3 ...... 9.8 31,6
1997 90.0 53.2 51.8 ............
* Commercial Banking System
Sources: BSP Statistical Bulletin, various years.
BSP Department of Economic Research
loans and overdrafts in 1995 (BSP 1996). Nevertheless, it appears
that Thailand's share understates the exposure of the Thai banks
to the real estate sector because a large portion of the real estate
loans was through the finance companies, many of which are
subsidiaries of the banks. It is likely that the lower exposure of
the Philippine banking system to the real estate sector may have
prevented the Philippine banks from going under from the
slackening real estate market in the country. It is apparent,
however, that if the current high interest rate regime continues
for some time, the real estate sector would slow down further,INTAL&LLANTO:FINANCIAL REFORM 45
possibly making the Philippine banking system more vulnerable
to loan defaults.
Despite the significant expansion in bank credits in recent
years, the overall inflation rate declined during the period.
Contributory to this is the facilitative effect of the fiscal stance,
which was in surplus during 1994-96, thereby cushioning the
monetary impact from the increase in domestic credits to the
private sector. The fiscal surplus was also complementary to the
policy of the government to sterilize capital flows. BSP became a
net purchaser of foreign exchange during the past few years in
an attempt in part to prevent a sharper appreciation of the peso
arising from the inflows. In order to minimize the monetary
effect of such foreign exchange purchases, the BSP sold
government securities in its portfolio. In Figure 3, the increase in
net foreign assets of the monetary authorities was offset somewhat
by a decrease in the net domestic credits of the monetary
authorities in 1994 "and 1996.
The sterilization of the capital flows appears to have also
contributed to the persistence of a higher interest rate domestically
as compared to foreign interest rates. However, the relationship
is not clear-cut: comparing the interest rate on the 91-day peso
Treasury bill and the 91-day LIBOR adjusted for the rate of peso
depreciation, the interest differential declined significantly from
about 10.81 percent in 1994 to 8.32 percent in 1995 and 4.87
percent in 1996. The reduction in the interest differential was
caused primarily by the changes in the exchange rate, rather
than in the domestic interest rate. The reduction in the interest
differential through the peso depreciation in the face of the rise
in capital flows during 1994-96 seems to be inconsistent with
the implications of increased financial integration internationally.
Indeed, the results seem to suggest that there remains a significant
risk premium on the Philippines, which discouraged large net
inflows of portfolio capital into the country given the domestic
interest rate (i.e., the domestic interest rate was not high enough).
Instead, the interest differential encouraged large private
borrowing from abroad by domestic firms and banks to take













































































































the government was to encourage Philippine direct and indirect
exporters to tap the foreign currency deposit units for dollar
loans in order to reduce their interest cost and thereby retain
their international competitiveness in the face of the appreciation
in real terms of the Philippine peso. In the light of the significant
depreciation of the peso in recent months, this particular policy
has made banks vulnerable to currency risk and possible
mismatch of maturity terms. This is because much of the increase
in the international indebtedness of banks was in foreign currency
deposits which are viewed to be short term given that depositors
can withdraw them anytime. As Table 11 indicates, banks' foreign
exchange assets are lower than their foreign exchange liabilities.
Exchange rate, competitiveness and economic restructuring.
The evolution of the country's real bilateral exchange rate (viz.,
the US dollar) and real effective exchange rate during the 1975-
96 period can be subdivided into three phases, namely: a phase
of appreciation during the late 1970s through the early 1980s,
followed by a secular if volatile depreciation during 1983-88,
and finally another phase of secular appreciation during 1989-
96 (.Figure 4a). Figure 4a also shows the country's external terms
of trade, which deteriorated secularly during the late 1970s and
the 1980s and improved during the 1990s. Figure 4b shows the
significant rise in the ratios of workers' remittances and peso
conversions to GDP during the 1990s.
The theoretical literature suggests that there is an inverse
relationship between the external terms of trade and the real
exchange rate; that is, it is expected that considerable improvement
(deterioration) in the external terms of trade would lead to an
(equilibrium) appreciation (depreciation) in the real exchange
rate. The appreciation of the peso in the 1990s appears to stem
in part from the improvement in the external terms of trade. It is
also likely that the real appreciation of the peso is attributable to
the rise in the workers' remittances and the peso conversions of
foreign currency deposits (which are either workers' remittances,
export proceeds or foreign loan proceeds deposited in the foreign
currency deposits). Considering the small and inconsistent flows
into the Philippines on a net basis (see Table 10), it is likely that48 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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portfolio capital was not a major cause of the real appreciation
of the peso. Thus, to some extent, the real appreciation of the
peso in recent years appears to be a mild form of "Dutch disease"
rather than a result of the impact of foreign portfolio flows.
The real appreciation of the peso in recent years contributed
to the pressures for restructuring of the industrial sector.
Specifically, a number of labor-intensive industries in the country,
especially garments and textiles, were forced to streamline
operations. For example, domestic production and employment
of textiles declined at the same time that exports of textiles
increased. This arose because grossly inefficient firms closed
down while others began to operate new machines which were
less labor using. As a result, a few firms have started finding
their export niches. In the garments industry, both exports and
domestic production declined in 1996 and 1997, suggesting that
the hndustry may be losing competitiveness in the international
and domestic markets. Industry officials have blamed the rising
wage rates and real appreciation of the peso as major causes for
the deteriorating international competitiveness of the industry,
suggesting that productivity improvements in the industry have
not been substantial enough to offset the rise in input costs. The
decline in the textile and garments industries in the Philippines
may be viewed as surprising given the low per capita income of
the country relative to the other countries in the region which
are still significant garment and/or textile exporters
(e.g., Thailand, Indonesia, Hong Kong). It is in this light that
the real appreciation of the peso in recent years has a signi-
ficant bearing on the fortunes of such industries in the Philip-
pines.
International competitiveness is, of course, a product of many
factors apart from the exchange rate. Most of the other factors
can possibly be put under the rubric of "productivity" factors,
including infrastructure, quality of labor and transactions cost of
trading (especially in the export of outputs and import of inputs).
The real appreciation of the peso necessitates, in effect, greater
reliance on productivity factors in order to maintain/improve
international competitiveness. However, the performance of the50 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Philippines in this area also leaves much to be desired. Thus, in
the Philippine context, addressing the international competitiveness
challenges would involve both improvements in the "productivity"
factors and adjustments in the real exchange rate (Intal 1995).
Managing capital flows and the exchange rate. The
experiences of countries in East Asia and Mexico in recent years
indicate that managing capital flows is not easy. Under a fixed
exchange rate regime, large capital flows influence the real
exchange rate via the increase in the inflationary pressures in
the domestic economy arising from the monetary effect of the
capital inflows, especially where there is incomplete sterilization
of the capital inflows. On the other hand, a complete sterilization
of the capital flows results in domestic interest rates that are
significantly higher than world interest rates (e.g., LIBOR)
especially where the domestic market for government securities
is still thin. The high domestic interest rate under a fixed exchange
rate regime encourages foreign borrowing by domestic firms or
by domestic banks and other financial institutions for ,relending
domestically. In this case, the danger of unsound credit decisions
increases. In addition, the higher domestic interest rate may
encourage further interest rate sensitive capital inflows, and this
gives rise to the issue of whether the flows are effectively absorbed
and converted into real capital expansion (i.e., physical capital)
rather than asset inflation (especially in the real estate sector) or
simple reserve accumulation (World Bank 1996). As the recent
Thai or Indonesian cases indicate, where prudential regulations
are either weak or poorly implemented, a currency and financial
crisis can eventually occur because of overborrowing, distortions
in credit allocations, asset bubbles and deteriorating export
competitiveness.
Under a regime of flexible exchange rates, the financial system
is shielded more from the capital flows, as monetary policy has
greater leeway. Nevertheless, large capital inflows tend to lead
to a nominal (and therefore real) appreciation of the currencies
of the recipient countries. Where such exchange rate appreciation
is large, exporters may lose customers in the export market which,
as the hysteresis literature indicates, are difficult to woo back.INTAL & LLANTO: FINANCIAL REFORM 51.
Considering that increased capital inflows means increased
indebtedness of the country, it is important that export growth
remain robust in the recipient country.
Drawing from the above discussion, in either case of floating
exchange rate or fixed exchange rate, large capital inflows can
potentially be distortive when the domestic financial market is
not large or deep enough to accommodate such flows. The
impacts of large capital inflows can be a mixture of nominal
currency appreciation, asset inflation, increasingly risky credit
decisions, domestic inflationary pressures, real exchange rate
appreciation, and likely eventual deteriorating export
performance. Thus, there seems to be some merit in moderating
capital inflows especially when macroeconomic or microeconomic
problems start to appear.
In this regard, the experience of Chile is relevant. Chile
imposed differential regulations on capital flows. Specifically,
Chile is fairly liberal with respect to foreign direct investment,
except for a one-year minimum stay. More stringent rules are
imposed on foreign borrowing to limit foreign indebtedness by
the imposition of minimum credit ratings by three internationally
recognized risk-rating agencies. Regulations on debt-related
capital flows and on deposits of nonresidents are even tighter
through the imposition of a 30 percent reserve requirement. These
regulations have allowed Chile to manage better capital inflows
such that there is more equity and long-term financing rather
than foreign debt and short- term financing. The macroeconomic
results have been impressive: high growth, lower inflation rate
and low current account deficit. (See Le Fort and Budnevich
1997.) As a result, Chile stands out as an important exception to
the problem that beset Mexico in 1994 and the Southeast Asian
economies in 1997.
Chile's foreign exchange regulations can best be viewed as
transitional rules in the meantime that the country deepens and
develops its financial system. It may be noted that Chile's financial
sector is open with respect to equity participation of foreign
investors and banks into the country's financial system. Thus,
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foreign .equity participation in the sector but relatively more
regulated with respect to capital flows. Chile's case contrasts
somewhat with those of a number of East Asian countries where
capital flows have been relatively free while foreign equity
participation in the financial sector has been more limited.
V. STRENGTHENING PRUDENTIAL
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
The need to strengthen prudential regulation and bank
supervision. The recent turmoil in the region's financial markets
indicates the pressing need to strengthen prudential regulation
and bank supervision. In the Philippines as in other countries
which have liberalized and deregulated their financial markets,
the process of competition, liberalization and growing financial
integration has brought to the financial marketplace various
financial innovations and practices that meant better products
and services to depositors and borrowers alike. At the same
time, however, banking has become more competitive, and, given
the incentive to lend to the nontradable sector, some banks have
taken large exposure in certain risky activities, e.g., the property
sector, which present excellent opportunities for speculation.
While aggressive risk-taking may have bolstered the profitability
of some banking institutions, in retrospect, this has undermined
the viability of the institutions concerned. Fearful of the local
banks' aggressive lending to the property sector, the Bangko
Sentral conducted a special investigation of the loan portfolios
of banks to determine potential loan default problems and,
subsequently, enjoined banks to limit their lending exposure to
the property sector. More generally, the structural changes in the
real economy require a robust financial system and, thus, the
health and efficiency of the banking system, especially since it
still dominates the financial system, are paramount concerns of
the regulatory authorities. This calls for efficient and effective
supervision and regulation, which in turn require the
strengthening of the regulatory institutions. The experience of
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supervision is instructive, allowing us to draw some insights
from it. (See Box A.)
The emerging financial system indicates the areas where
supervision and regulation must be strengthened. In the
developed countries, the trend is toward a "disintermediated,
liquid, securitized structure" where "the more creditworthy
corporate borrowers in major industrial countries are increasingly
able to satisfy their liquidity, risk-management, and financing
needs directly in liquid securities markets" (Goldstein et al. 1992).
In those countries, commercial paper, repurchase agreements,
money-market mutual funds and exchange-traded futures and
options are the main financing instruments. The so-called
"relationship banking" is rapidly giving way to "transactions-
driven securities finance" which has caused the decline of banks'
on-balance sheet activities and the rise in off-balance sheet
activities (e.g., standby lines of credit, forward interest rates,
foreign exchange contracts, and the rapidly growing derivative
business). Transactions-driven securities finance requires different
skills and techniques from regulatory institutions although there
are some areas such as information disclosure procedures,
accounting and auditing, etc., which demand a common set of
skills and approaches.
In contrast, in developing countries such as the Philippines,
banks, especially commercial banks, continue to dominate the
financial system despite the substantial developments taking place
in the equities and securities markets in the region. Because of
the continuing dominance of the banking system, most of the
areas for improvement and strengthening with respect to
supervision and regulation pertain to banking activities. For
example, many banks in the region have liquidity problems.
State-directed lending, political pressures and poor lending
practices, particularly by state-owned banks, remain pervasive
while accounting and auditing, and disclosure procedures are
not up to international standards (Claessens and Glaessner 1997a).
Strong prudential regulation and bank supervision are extremely
important to avoid moral hazard in the credit markets arising
from excessive risk- taking by banks, corruption or fraud as54 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Box A. Banking crisis and financial regulation: Chile and
Malaysia
The Chilean experience shows that, without a proper framework
of prudential regulation, economic and financial liberalization may
lead to abuses of market power, conflicts of interest and unsustainable
and imprudent expansion.
In 1982, the private sector overborrowed, leaving banks
overextended. The massive inflow of foreign funds helped fuel the
unprecedented credit expansion. Chilean analysts (Morande 1988;
Valdes 1989) later pointed out that foreign inflows systematically
preceded the peso appreciation and that the imprudent period of
foreign borrowing in 1981 was motivated by the perception of a
permanent boom. This perception led to overborrowing and
relaxation of credit standards. The authorities tried to maintain a
fixed exchange rate policy which spurred even greater foreign
borrowing as economic agents anticipated the collapse of the peg
and took advantage of the in_plicit subsidy on foreign exchange risk.
Meanwhile, throughout the three years of the fixed exchange rate
regime, the spread between the peso deposit rate and the LIBOR
remained stable but very high. The financial collapse was triggered
by the rise in international interest rates in the last quarter of 1981.
Real interest rate in pesos rose from 5 percent in 1980 to 30 percent
in 1982! The weak banking system and the high level of indebtedness
in the economy and massive withdrawal of foreign credit at the end
of 1981 led to a deep recession. The authorities had to intervene to
avert a complete collapse of the financial system. They provided
emergency loans to all banks, with the central bank assuming all
bad loans, or some 28 percent of the total loan portfolio of the banking
system. Considerable reform was introduced in the financial markets.
Prudential regulation and supervision were strengthened. The costly
lesson from the financial sector's point of view: prudential regulation
and supervision are extremely important alongside macroeconomic
stability and an undistorted set of incentives in building a robust
and efficient financial system.
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Box A (continued)
The Malaysian experience is a study in contrast. It underwent a
banking crisis and restructuring in the mid-1980s. In 1985-86,
Malaysia suffered from deflation. Nominal GNP declined more
rapidly than real GNP. The financial system suffered immensely
from steep falls in commodity, securities, and property prices.
Previously, there was a long period of expansion and speculative
investments in property and equities. In 1986, property loans
accounted for 36 percent of all bank loans, up from 26 percent in
1980. Faced with a potentially major financial crisis, the authorities
acted decisively. Fortunately for Malaysia, there was in place an
effective system of bank supervision: stiff requirements for
provisioning against bad and doubtful debts, suspension of interest
accrual. Additionally, the authorities introduced key changes in
banking laws and regulations to emphasize prudential standards,
such as minimum capital requirements, dispersion of ownership
controls on connected lending, limits on risk concentrations,
guidelines on provisions for loan losses and suspension of interest
accrual on nonperforming loans, and improved statistical reporting
to the central bank. The central bank was also authorized to enter
and search offices, detain persons, impound passports, freeze
property, issue cease and desist orders, and assume control of bank
operations. By taking prompt action to assess the extent of losses
and address problems of capital adequacy and competent
management in the banking system, the potentially major financial
crisis and loss of confidence in the financial system were averted.
Source: Dimitri Vita$ (1992).
exemplified by fictitious loans provided by banks in collusion
with government agricultural technicians under the government's
subsidized agricultural credit program for rice production
(Masagana 99 program) in the 1980s and by the recent experience
of a thrift bank which nearly collapsed because of an enormous
loan collection problem (see Box B).
Capital adequacy. Prudential regulation and bank supervision
are intended to gain stability and public trust in the financial
system. This requires adequate and effective management of
potential systemic risk and protection of depositors. The56 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT 'l
Box B. Keeping an eye on borrowers and loan collection
Monte de Piedad was the oldest thrift bank in the country. Ithad
survived two world wars and the severe economic and financial crisis
of 1983-85. In 1991, it implemented a loan program for teachers and
tricycle drivers. It also engaged in a lending scheme via conduits to
help the poor. But lack of control and abuse by bank officials who
implemented the lending scheme forced an audit in January 1994.
Auditors found out that most of the borrowers were fictitious persons.
In August 1994, the conduit in the loan programs, the Strategic
Lending Investors (SLI), stopped collecting the loans for the bank. In
October 1994, SLI closed shop. The bank temporarily closed shop in
April 1997 because of the huge collection problems.
The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) noted that the bank had
extended some P2.5 billion in tricycle and salary loans to public school
teachers without keeping any record of the borrowers' names and
determining their capacity to pay. In 1997, to avert the collapse of the
bank, shares were sold to the Keppel Group of Singapore, which is
now the majority shareowner of the bank. The BSP, meanwhile,
conducted an audit and found out the following:
• Management failed to maintain essential accounting records
such as the individual or subsidiary ledgers for the loan
accounts.
• The lack of essential records and loss of internal control made
the monitoring system utterly unreliable.
• The lending scheme was a program without borrower records
and internal controls, and with an unreliable monitoring
system.
• The loans envisioned for the underprivileged were coursed
through the SLI, a corporation that had a capitalization of
only P100,000.
• The bank tapped SLI to act both as its conduit and collection
arm for the loans, an arrangement that was deemed by the
BSP to be one-sided and disadvantageous to the bank.
The BSP found directors and officials of the bank guilty of unsound
banking practices and ordered them to pay administrative fines
ranging from P50,000 to P80,000 for the P2.5 billion that the bank
failed to account for and collect.
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immediate requirement, therefore, is to strengthen prudential
regulation with respect to capital adequacy and the method of
banking supervision. Philippine banks are not as sufficiently
capitalized as their regional counterparts. BSP has time and
again called for adequate capitalization of banks as the first line
of defense against market volatility and uncertainty. It has
encouraged the adoption of the BIS risk-based capital adequacy
guidelines. The government has proposed an amendment to the
General Banking Act, a law crafted in 1948, which will require
banks to adopt the international formula for capital adequacy
prescribed by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
There is some trade-off between the ease of entry and com-
petition in the banking industry and the stability and safety of
banking institutions arising from higher capital requirements.
Given the trend toward financial integration and more
innovations in the financial marketplace, adequate capital will
be a must to maintain the stability of the banking system and
protect clients. However, a number of local researchers have
voiced fear about greater concentration that may be brought
about by high capital requirements, exacerbating the oligopolistic
structure of the banking industry (Tan 1989; Lamberte 1993). In
the money market, Yap et al. (1990) observed the interlocking
with investment institutions, which increased the relative
importance of certain banks and made the money market less
diversified. Yap documented that three banks directly accounted
for only 13 percent of total deposit substitutes of all financial
institutions with quasi-banking licenses, but their affiliates had
35 percent of total money market balances.
Nevertheless, the danger of greater concentration and,
therefore, worsening of the oligopolistic structure of the industry
could be offset by introducing greater competition, contestability,
and transparency in the financial markets. Thus, for example,
eliminating restrictions imposed on banks and specialized
financial institutions will foster competition. The abolition of
subsidized loan programs and the privatization of government
financial institutions will also introduce greater competition in
the financial markets. Similarly, further development of the58 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
securities markets can offer greater direct competition to loans
provided by banks. Finally, the entry of foreign banks into the
sector can also be eased further.
The more valid fear should arise from interlocking ownership,
which may be aggravated by high capital requirements. The
Philippines is no exception to interlocking ownership, which
exists among some of the biggest financial, trading and industrial
firms. The interlocking ownership creates the incentive to provide
credit to ailing but jointly owned firms for certain reasons. The
antidote here is not a policy that blocks high capital requirements
but a policy that fosters greater competition and contestability in
the financial marketplace and effective prudential regulation and
supervision that requires transparency and disclosure of
information.
Comprehensive risk-based supervision. Traditionally, the
regulatory institutions and banks alike have concerned themselves
only with credit risk. However, the new emerging financial
environment and structuralchanges in the real economy have
engendered new types of risks or have highlighted the existence
of various types of risks heretofore ignored by regulators and
banks. Risk-based supervision, in the sense of a more
comprehensive risk perspective, is a new area for the Bangko
Sentral. Given the fiduciary responsibilities of the banking sector,
risk management is more difficult for this sector than for the
securitized market (Goldstein et al. 1992).
The growing competition from the securities market has
induced banks to shift to higher-risk but higher-return activities.
This strategy is shown by the commercial banks' exposure to off-
balance sheet activities such as contingent commitments,
underwriting of security issues, swap transactions, derivatives
and other activities yielding noninterest incomes. However, the
decline of on-balance sheet activities and the expansion of off-
balance sheet activities have contributed to the "growing
opaqueness of the financial system" (Goldstein et al. 1992). The
net effect is the increased riskiness of banks and the inadequacy
of traditional prudential regulation and supervision approaches
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their exposure to risk because of different risk management
instruments offered by banks. The problem is that "it has become
increasingly difficult to assess the risk exposure of the entire
consolidated balance sheet of financial institutions that are
counterparties to these (risk or hedging) instruments." (ibid.)
Prudential regulations must cover the entire spectrum of risks
in the banking industry (Fischer and Reisen 1992). Traditionally,
prudential regulation and supervision covered only credit risk.
Recent research (Fitzgerald et al. 1997) indicates that Philippine
bank regulation and supervision have assessed risk without the
benefit of a formal framework and terminology, Informal analysis
was the order of the day as banks prior to deregulation and
liberalization had a narrow scope of products and services. The
complexity of the deregulated and liberalized financial markets
is now forcing a reassessment of the risk management technology
employed by banks and regulators. Fitzgerald eta!, (1997) hold
the view that "traditional methods for looking at risk are being
strained and are often inadequate." The suggestion is for
Philippine bank regulators and supervisors to consider a formal
process and common terminology for assessing risk and risk
management systems such as those found in national banks in
the United States.
in this respect, the Office of the Comptroller of th e Currency
(OCC, United States Treasury Department) identified and defined
nine risks that must be assessed to develop accurate risk pro-
files of banking institutions for which requisite regulatory action
may be developed (ibid.). The nine different types of risks are as
follows s :
. Credit risk: Credit risk exists when a bank is dependent upon
another party to make or keep the loans integral. On- and
off-balance sheet exposure creates credit risks for banks.
° Liquidih d risk. This arises when a bank has insufficient access
to funds and is too heavily dependent on limited sources of
6. The short discussion for each type of risk is from a presentation of Thomas
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funding. The inability to meet deposit withdrawals and loan
requests and to liquidate assets without significant loss to the
bank constitutes liquidity risk.
• Price risk. This is comprised of risk to capital, earnings and
liquidity arising from changes in the value of portfolios of
financial institutions. Market making, dealing and position
taking may give rise to price risk.
• Transaction risk. This is brought about by problems associated
with service or product delivery. This is also known as
operating or operational risk. The accuracy and timeliness of
reports, presence of security controls, fraud prevention and
fraud detection measures are important elements of ba_nk
operation, and the inadequacy of these measures creates
transaction risk.
• Interest rate risk. The movement of interest rates affects the
portfolios of financial institutions and inability to adjust
interest rates to changing economic and financial conditions
constitutes interest rate risk.
• Foreign exchange risk. This pertains to risks associated with
movements in foreign currency rates and will matter a lot if
a bank has foreign currency denominated loans and equity
investments. Table 12 reproduces some statistics cited by a
well-known columnist from a Deutsche Morgan Grenfell
(DMG) report on the status of US dollar denominated loans
of eight Philippine banks. It vividly illustrates the risk
associated with having a large exposure in a foreign currency
denominated loan. What may make matters worse is that
some 20 percent of the dollar borrowers do not have foreign
currency (dollar) revenues. Dollar loans increased by some
$5.7 billion between 1995 and 1996. The contribution of US
dollar loans to the growth in total loans rose from 12 percent
in 1993 to as much as 40 percent during the first half of
1997.
° Reputation risk. The bank's public reputation affects its ability
to establish or sustain customer relationships. This is because
banking is essentially a trust business and good reputation is
a sine qua non in the industry.INTAL & LLANTO: FINANCIAL REFORM 61
TABLE 12
US Dollar Loans of Eight Philippine Commercial Banks
Year Loans Increase Growth of. Contribution of Loans
($ M) in $ Loans Loans (%) to Loan Growth (%)
1993 2,493 464 23 12
1994 3,595 1,102 44 24
1995 5,408 1,813 50 24
1996 11,094 5,686 105 35
1997Q1 11,585 4,946 74 40
Source: Solita Monsod, citing a DMG report.
• Strategic risk. This type of risk pertains to the implementation
of the bank's business plan. It focuses on how the
implementation of those plans affects the bank's value. It is
important to consider how the bank management handles
uncontrollable factors such as changes in rules and
regulations, new competition, changes in technology, and
the financial environment.
• Compliance risk. The bank's nonconformance with laws,
regulations, accounting standards, ethical standards, etc.,
results in compliance risk. The corresponding fines, penalties,
damages or sanctions harm the bank's reputation and
operational capacity.
What is evident is that the present credit risk based
supervision must give way to a more comprehensive risk-based
supervision, which takes into account various types of risks that
may affect the viability of a financial institution. The last three
risks are less quantifiable than the first six as noted in the
Fitzgerald report. However, the identification of these different
risks implies that the BSP and the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Company (PDIC) must start looking at advanced risk
management techniques.
The traditional check against credit risk is the existence of a
collateral (usually real estate mortgage, liquid government
securities, hold-on deposits at the lending bank) which the bank
can seize upon loan default. However, heavy reliance on collateral62 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
"mitigates risk by avoiding risk rather than managing risk"
(Fitzgerald et al. 1992). The immediate effect is that banks tend
to be very conservative, thereby serving fewer borrowers.
Conversely, "good risk management techniques" will enable
"lenders to take on more risks, serve more borrowers, and earn
higher returns while reducing the risk of loss (ibid.). The suggestion
is that understanding and employing advanced risk management
techniques could be helpful to both financial institutions and
regulatory institutions. The former can maximize returns while
minimizing risk of loss while the latter can anticipate and prevent
systemic risk in the financial markets.
In summary, the common practice is to check on compliance
with banking laws and regulations which does not necessarily
imply that activities or decisions posing the greatest risk to the
bank are being considered at all. 7 Examiners routinely check
compliance with banking laws, assess internal controls and
apprise management. They do not necessarily evaluate the bank's
lending policies although they profile loans but do not necessarily
consider loans that are in the initial stage of delinquency
(Fitzgerald et al. 1997). Hence, it is important for the BSP and
PDIC to move away from simple checking of compliance with
banking laws and regulations to risk-based assessment and
supervision. To do this, Polizatto (1990) recommends, among
others, a "top-down approach" which reviews the direction and
policies laid down by the board of directors and top management.
It is not enough for one to determine the magnitude of the
problem. Far more important is the ability to anticipate problem
areas and prevent the likelihood of their occurrence.
Information disclosure and adequate accounting and auditing
standards. The integrity of the financial system rests on adequate
information disclosure by the supervised financial institutions.
7. For example, the failure to anticipate the rise of problem loans is shown in the
experience of Monte de Piedad Savings Bank (Box B above) and also that of several
commercial banks which were shocked by the loan default of the EYCO group of
companies and Victorias Milling Corporation which owed them several billion pesos
of loans. EYCO asked for a moratorium on its debt payments to 22 creditor banks.
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The intertemporal character of financial transactions compels
the disclosure of information on the bank and its activities not
only to shareholders but also to bank supervisors and, to some
extent, the public. Because of limited bank supervisory resources,
off-site surveillance is extremely necessary. Adequate information
disclosure is, thus, imperative. Philippine banks generally adhere
to accepted accounting and auditing standards and, thus, pro-
vide information that is reflective of their true financial condition
(Lamberte and Llanto 1995). They submit regular reports to
the BSP which help supervisors in gauging their financial
condition.
Nonetheless, accounting and auditing standards need to be
strengthened. Standards to be established include guidelines for
asset classification, a stricter definition of past dues and non-
performing assets, prohibition against capitalization of refinancing
of interest which is due and unpaid, reversal of previously
accrued but uncollected interest on nonperforming assets,
adequate provision for actual or potential loan losses, and
guidelines for the recognition of foreign exchange losses and
other losses (Polizatto 1990).
It is imperative that the BSP and PDIC not be content with
checking the submitted reports for compliance with rules and
regulations, e.g., those pertaining to liquidity, and reserve
requirements, credit guidelines, and computation of certain
balance sheet ratios, e.g., for CAMEL rating purposes. More
information is needed on data on the bank's loan portfolio,
especially delinquencies, problem assets, foreign exchange
position, off-balance sheet commitments, and other risk areas. It
is instructive that when there was great concern about the
exposure of the banking industry to the property sector, the BSP
had to resort to a special survey of selected banks to get the
information.
The adherence of banks to improved accounting and
disclosure standards is critical. Banks represent the first key line
of defense against systemic risk and weakening of the financial
system. Thus, banks need to be induced to adopt better risk
management techniques, especially vis-a-vis innovations in the64 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
financial marketplace, e.g., derivatives. Goldstein and Folkerts-
Landau (1994) point out the increasing importance of deri-
vative positions and activities among banks, securities firms and
other players. Accurate risk assessment has up to now been
hobbled by a lack of transparency about this type of exposure.
A bank's balance sheet cannot be assumed to be sufficient to
protect a bank from trading exposure. The bank must have an
effective risk management strategy that "will catch an
ill-conceived trading strategy or a faulty hedge before it takes
place, or failing to do that, at least ensure that when losses
reach a pre-specified limit, operations are cut back to prevent
even larger losses from being sustained" (Goldstein and Folkerts-
Landau 1994, p. 30).
Asset classification and provisioning. The balance sheet and
the income statement may not provide accurate information on
the actual condition of the bank if there has been a failure to
classify problem assets, make provision for losses, and apply
consistent charge-off or write-off policies. Apparently, Philippine
practice in this area has been deficient. A recent study (Fitzgerald
et al. 1997) revealed that there is no official or uniform charge-
off or write-off policy. Banks are required to submit quarterly
reports on loan charge-offs. The BSP uses the ratio of loan charge
offs to the total loan portfolio as an indicator for its off-site
supervision. However, while lending institutions determine when
a loan is to be charged off, the timing of the loan charge-off
depends partly on its effect on the bank's capital position and
the associated tax effect. Thus, a loan charge-off could be
postponed because it will deplete capital and the depletion will
trigger the need to bring in more capital. If no new capital is in
sight, then the loan charge off could be deferred. The tax angle
comes into the picture because, under the country's tax rules,
loans must first be charged off before they are allowed as
deduction for income tax purposes. The timing of the charge-off
is partly determined by the tax avoidance process of banks and
not necessarily by the need to reflect the true financial condition
of the bank which may require new capital. Clearly, the priority
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objective of reflecting the bank's true financial condition. Thus,
a strict implementation of a loan charge-off policy is needed.
In view of the regional currency and financial turmoil, the
BSP is set to require 8 banks to submit detailed and regular reports
on nonperforming loans. The intention is to have an accurate
gauge of the financial health of banks. The BSP has, thus,
required banks to set up a general loan loss provision equivalent
to 2 percent of the total loan portfolio in addition to the allowance
for probable losses on substandard and doubtful loan accounts.
It also redefined nonperforming loans as "loans in arrears for
more than 3 months." Previously, nonperforming loans were
those in arrears for more than six months. According to the BSP,
in addition to nonperforming loans the banks would be required
to report every quarter the following: restructured loans, loans
to directors, stockholders and related interests (so-called DOSRI
loans), amount of general loan loss provision, loan loss provision
for specific accounts, provision for losses of other asset accounts,
unbooked valuation reserves and investment in government
securities. The banks claim that these are already contained in
the reports they have submitted to the BSP. However, it seems
that these details are not reflected in those reports.
Incentives for monitoring the bank's financial soundness. Are
there alternatives to the traditional exhortation to monetary
authorities and banks to monitor the financial soundness of these
institutions? Recent literature (Caprio 1997) has suggested that,
apart from bank regulators/supervisors and bank managers, the
owners of banks represent an interest group that could be
motivated to monitor the financial soundness of banks. There has
been a debate on the appropriate approach to bank regulation
and supervision: should we go for stronger regulatory institutions
(following the BIS requirement for higher capital and improved
monitoring) or should there be more of the market approach
(relying on incentives to managers and owners) proposed by the
Reserve Bank of New Zealand? Although this paper is not the
8. Newspaper reports say the BSP is targeting the implementation of the new
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place to analyze the contrasting positions, the idea of bank owners
as an interest group needing appropriate incentives to look after
the health of banks is intuitively appealing. Thus, in addition to
creating an incentive structure that will motivate bank regulators
and supervisors and bank managers to foster the financial
soundness of banks, a complementary incentive mechanism for
bank owners is most ideal. Caprio (1997) argued that greater
liability limits, increasing the franchise value of bank licenses or
higher capital may improve incentives for bank owners and
minimize the need for supervisory oversight.
Incentives and disclosure are the main elements of the
market-based approach. The New Zealand authorities
minimized public sector presence and involvement in the
economy, including the financial markets. Thus, they showed a
commitment to an open banking system and to keep compliance
costs low. Market discipline in this case is expected to promote
the soundness and efficiency of the financial system (Caprio
1997). Box C describes the market-based approach adopted by
New Zealand.
VI. STRENGTHENING REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS 9
The regulatory institutions are, principally, the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas (BSP) and, secondarily, the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC). The PDIC oversees the activities
of banks that have secured deposit insurance from it as required
by law, although its focus has been mainly on the rural banking
system. The BSP was recently created by an Act of Congress
9. Insteadof strengtheningregulatoryinstitutions,New Zealandhas proposed
a n_arketapproach.Regulatoryconstraintson banks would be reduced m favor of
publicdisclosureand marketdiscipline.Prudentialrequirementswouldbe eliminated
exceptcapital standards.Bankdirectorswill have a greater responsibilityfor sound
managementof theirbanks.Credit rating will be extensivelyutilized and displayed
on bank premisesas part of strengthenedpublicdisclosurerequirements.SeeMorris
Goldsteinand DavidFolkerts-Landau, "InternationalCapital Markets:Developments,
Prospectsand Policyissues,"WorldEconomicand FinancialSurveys,International
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Box C. New Zealand's market-based approach to bank regu-
lation
The focus of the market-based approach is on disclosure and
incentives. Banks must issue quarterly public disclosure statements
which carry the usual information on the balance sheet and income
statement, the composition of the board of directors, any conflict of
interest any member may have, asset quality and provisioning, loan
concentration data to individuals and sectors, lending to related
parties, risk management systems, capital adequacy and off-balance
sheet exposure, marketrisk exposure, any guarantees and their credit
ratings. This extensive disclosure system can induce bank
management to be more prudent. Full disclosure is available on
demand and abbreviated statements must be posted in all bank
branches. Ifthe authorities discover information not available in the
market, they are obliged to disclose itwithin the quarter.
Source: Caprio (I997) citing Peter Nicholl, "Market-basedRegulation,"
mimeo., The World Bank.
because the former Central Bank of the Philippines (CBP) had to
close shop in view of its inability to implement monetary policy
resulting from its huge stock of accumulated losses. The CBP's
effectiveness in implementing monetary policy was diminished
because it had to continuously create money or issue debt
instruments to service its indebtedness. The BSP was given the
prime task of maintaining price stability while at the same time
remaining as the supervisor and regulator of financial institutions.
The law that created the BSP established a Central Bank Board
of Liquidators with the unenviable task of retiring the huge
indebtedness of the defunct Central Bank of the Philippines.
Congress also provided for a PS0 billion capitalization of BSP
and the simplification of its mandate by asking it to focus on the
maintenance of price stability. Thus, the BSP is a much stronger
institution than the old Central Bank of the Philippines.68 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
A critical aspect of bank regulation and supervision is clarity
about the role of regulatory/supervisory institutions in the mind
of the public and policymakers. Bank regulation and supervision
have to do with the protection of depositors, monetary stability
and an efficient and competitive financial system. Thus, bank
regulators/supervisors must have the support of the banking
industry and government to remain independent and honest.
This also means that political interference must be avoided.
Preservation of the integrity of the financial system must be
paramount, and this cannot be sacrificed for short-term political
goals, e.g., unsustainable subsidized credit programs. Without
the required support and understanding of their role, bank
regulators/supervisors will be ineffective (see Polizatto 1990).
In this regard, a review of BSP's regulatory and supervisory
powers under the General Banking Act is in order. Specifically,
the following amendments have been proposed:
• updating of banks' classification system
• prescribing the duties and responsibilities of directors and
officers
° regulating the payments of compensation to directors and
officers in exceptional cases
° authorizing the Monetary Board (of BSP) to suspend or
remove directors and officers found unfit to continue
holding office
° rationalizing the powers of banks to invest in allied and
nonallied enterprises
° clarifying the operations of trust entities
° allowing flexibility in complying with international
conventions.
These bring to mind the ability of the Malaysian authorities
to act decisively in averting an impending financial crisis. As
related in Box A above, the Malaysian authorities exercised ample
powers to restore confidence and stability in their financial
system. The proposed amendments seek to provide the BSP with
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for there is a prevailing view that the law which created it did
not vest it with ample regulatory and supervisory powers. 1°
The supervisory approach relying on checking compliance
with banking laws and regulations should be complemented by
a risk-based supervisory approach. Presently, there is heavy
emphasis on on-site examination. This paper suggests that a
bank supervision approach composed of (1) off-site supervision,
(2) on-site examination, and (3) the compliance function could
be more effective. The operating departments of the Supervision
and Examination Sector of BSP use mainly on-site examination
as their supervisory tool. There is limited off-site analysis
conducted by these departments. The BSP has a Supervisory
Reports and Special Studies Office (SRSO) which receives regular
financial reports. It generates the financial statistical reports for
the use of the operating departments. Its main mission is to
review systems and procedures related to supervision and to
propose policy recommendations and amendments to existing
policies, rules and regulations. Given the information on the
banking sector that it possesses and can collect further, it may be
able to develop an effective early warning system to identify
potential problem banks. Thus, it could be a more effective off-
site examination office. There should thus be greater interaction
between the two operating departments of the BSE namely, the
Supervision and Examination Sector (SES) and the SRSO.
Through such interaction, the complementarities of off-site and
on-site examination can be exploited and even enhanced.
10. Forexample, the BSP deputy governorforsupervision was quoted by print
media as having said that Section 28 of the new law (R.A.7653)removed the "surprise
element" of bank examination. He allegedly said that BSPexaminerswere allowed to
look into the booksof banks "once every 12 months" with the next examination to be
scheduled "at least 12 months" later. A special examination must have prior approval
of the Monetary Board.A majorityvote of 5 out of 7 (members)is needed to conduct
a special examination of banks. It seems the BSPcannot just summarily remove
errantbankers but must observe"due process." It can mete out preventive suspension
of errant bankers for120 days and impose fines Ofup to P30,000a day (which is too
small, according to some quarters).Another issue is the desire of the BSPto have the
power to remove bank officials. R.A. 7635 authorizes the BSP to suspend but not
remove bank officials. This is a hotly contested issue with an opposition legislator
arguing against the "power to remove" idea.70 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
The third component of the risk-based supervision approach
is the compliance function. Its purpose is to introduce corrective
action on the deficiencies uncovered during on-site and off-site
examination. The compliance unit can thus monitor the
implementation of corrective action in cooperation with the
concerned banks and recommend further improvements and
sanctions.
The PDIC also conducts an examination of banks but relies
on the SES for information, for findings of BSP examiners, etc.
Under R.A. 7653 (New Central Bank Act of 1993) the receivership
and liquidation of rural banks were to be transferred to the
PDIC. The same recommendation on risk-based supervision is
appropriate for PDIC. It must likewise be strengthened in view
of its crucial role in deposit insurance and the receivership and
liquidation of rural banks. Finally, improved coordination between
PDIC and SES is desirable in view of their shared objective of
maintaining a sound and efficient financial system.
Strengthening monetary institutions for monetary policy
surveillance. Financial reform in the Philippines aimed at greater
flexibility in interest rates and greater market orientation in credit
allocation. These two meant a deemphasis on reserve requirement
as a monetary tool. The reserve requirement of the Philippines
has historically been much higher than that of other countries in
the region. The high reserve requirement imposed a high
intermediation cost which contributed to comparatively high
domestic lending rates and low saving rates. The program of
reduction in the reserve requirements in recent years is consistent
with the financial deregulation and reform program.
With the increasing deemphasis on the reserve requirement
as a monetary tool, the country necessarily would have to rely
more on indirect instruments of monetary control, especially
open market operations. This means changed transmission
channels of monetary policy, with possibly a diminished predictive
ability of monetary targets. The liberalization of the foreign
capital account further complicated the conduct of monetary
policy, as the exchange rate became a critical channel of monetary
policy itself. Thus, monetary authorities may have to look at aINTAL&LLANTO:FINANCIALREFORM 71
basket of indicators to serve as basis for monetary decision
making. (See Milo 1997.)
In the Philippine context, much remains to be done to
understand the transmission of monetary policy in the new
regime of financial deregulation and open capital accounts. There
is yet little technical, analytical and modelling research done in
this area. The weak result for both domestic credit and interest
rate in the output equation of Milo's (1997) vector autoregression
(VAR) model highlights the need for more in-depth analysis on
the interaction of the monetary, international and production
sectors of the economy in order to help monetary authorities
finetune their open market operations. This means the need for
greater technical analysis capacity in the monetary institutions,
especially the Bangko Sentral, apart from encouraging more
domestic research in monetary policy in the country.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The experience of the Philippines and Southeast Asian
countries during the past two decades suggests the following
key lessons:
1. Macroeconomic stability is critical to long-term growth of
the financial sector. Macroeconomic crises lead to financial
disintermediation as the Philippine experience during the mid-
1980s shows. The robust economic recovery since 1994 in the
Philippines has encouraged greater financial deepening. The
stable macroeconomy in recent years, with the implicit low
inflation expectations, has encouraged the expansion of formal
financial institutions deeper into the countryside and the urban
informal sector, thereby providing a stronger competitive pressure
vis-a-vis informal financial intermediaries (e.g., money lenders).
2. Prudential regulation and supervision is central to the
robust growth of the financial sector. The inherent problems of
risk management and asymmetric information in finance demand
a marked policy bias for effective prudential regulation,
monitoring and supervision of financial institutions. The financial72 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
crisis in the Philippines in the early 1980s was substantially
caused by lax prudential regulations and supervision and loose
banking practices. The ineffective prudential regulatory climate
was aggravated by distortions in incentives in the financial
market, especially through the subsidized directed credit schemes,
that further discouraged sound credit decisions especially by the
undercapitalized rural banking sector. As a result, the rural
banking sector, which neglected deposit mobilization, was
especially hard hit by the economic troubles of the early 1980s.
3. Capital flows can exacerbate weaknesses in the
macroeconomic regime and in prudential regulations and
supervision. Negative real borrowing rates from abroad combined
with a protectionist trade and industrial policy at home
encouraged foreign-debt financed investment expansion primarily
in the protected and nontradable sectors during the latter half of
the 1970s in the Philippines. The result was inefficient allocation
and utilization of investment and a worsening external debt
service problem at the start of the 1980s. This contributed
significantly to the country's slide into a deep economic crisis in
the mid-1980s.
4. Large capital flows - and the attendant high current account
deficits and/or fast rising level of international reserves in recipient
countries - under an open capital account create significant
macroeconomic policy challenges and rising credit risks. At the
very least, the domestic financial market and macroeconomic
conditions are vulnerable to changes in expectations of foreign
investors. Unsterilized capital flows lead to domestic inflationary
pressures and real appreciation of the domestic currency, thereby
resulting in a loss of international competitiveness of exports.
Effective sterilization, on the other hand, leads to a higher domestic
interest rate which encourages foreign borrowing by domestic firms.
This, however, raises problems of poor credit decisions and/or
investment decisions which ultimately lead to growing concerns
about the sustainability of the large current account deficit. In
short, large capital flows under a liberalized foreign exchange
market and open capital account demand a deep and efficient
financial sector as well as strong prudential regulations andINTAL&LLANTO:FINANCIALREFORM 73
supervision in order to minimize the potential distortive and risk-
augmenting effects of the flows.
5. The financial reforms during the past one and a half
decades, together with overall reforms in the economy and the
strengthening of rnacroeconomic fundamentals in the Philippines,
have resulted in the strengthening of the financial sector. The
financial reforms have focused on strengthening prudential
regulations, minimizing pricing distortions in credit decisions
(by eliminating subsidized credit from the ambit of the Central
Bank and imposing a uniform and market-based rediscount rate),
and (controlling) the liberalization of the entry of foreign banks
into the country's financial sector. The effects have been a
significant expansion of financial institutions, the entry of a
number of important international financial institutions, financial
deepening, a comparatively high capital adequacy ratio, and the
introduction of innovative banking services. In short, the country's
financial sector became more robust. As a result, the country has
so far been able to withstand the substantial depreciation of the
peso, the rise in the interest rate and the slowdown of the
economy without any incidence of a failed bank or financial
institution, unlike in Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea.
Nevertheless, as the recent currency and financial turmoil in
the region brings out, it is important to exercise greater vigilance
in prudential regulation, monitoring and supervision. In addition,
the capacity of the regulatory institutions needs to be improved,
foreign exchange regulations may have to be reviewed, and
greater contestability in the financial sector should be encouraged.
Specifically, the following are recommended:
1. Strengthening prudential regulation and supervision. This
involves the implementation of comprehensive risk-based assess-
ment and supervision, instead of focusing primarily on credit
risk. Banks have increasingly offered other financial products,
notably both on-balance sheet activities and off-balance sheet
activities, which have different risk configurations. Hence, bank
supervision would have to move towards a more comprehensive
risk-based assessment. In addition, there is a need for more
stringent information disclosure requirements, adequate74 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
accounting and auditing standards, as well as clearer rules and
greater transparency in asset classification and provisioning.
2. Strengthening regulatory institutions. This would require
modifications in the General Banking Act in order to give the
Central Bank clearer and stronger bank regulation and
supervision authority as well as strengthening an off-site office
that complements on-site inspection in risk-based supervision.
There is also a need to improve the Central Bank's analytic
capacity in understanding the transmission channels of monetary
policy and the interactions between the financial sector and the
rest of the economy.
3. Reviezo the policy on capital accounts and foreign borrowing.
The recent experience in Southeast Asia suggests that large capital
flows are difficult to manage in emerging financial markets
without significant adverse macroeconomic effects or worsening
credit risks. During the transition when the institutional capacities
are still being strengthened in line with the more comprehensive
risk-based supervision, it may be useful to look into the Chilean
policy for possible adoption or adaptation in the country.
Specifically, in the case of Chile, this entailed stricter rules on
domestic firms borrowing directly abroad (e.g., minimum credit
rating rule), the imposition of reserves on short-term foreign
currency deposits by nonresidents and other short portfolio flows,
and a one-year residency requirement on foreign direct
investment. The implicit policy bias towards equity and long-
term funds and against foreign borrowing and short-term funds
appears more consistent with susfainable growth and more
prudent banking risk management.
4. Greater contestability in the financial market. Here the
difference between Chile and the Southeast Asian countries is
relevant. In Southeast Asia, there is limited entry into the domestic
financial market by foreign institutions but a relatively free cross-
border flow of capital. In contrast, Chile imposed some controls on
cross-border capital flows but allowed more liberal entry by foreign
institutions into the Chilean financial market (Claessens and
Gaessner !997b). Greater entry of foreign financial institutions into
the domestic market would induce greater contestability in theINTAL &LLANTO: FINANCIAL REFORM 75
market, contribute to the deepening of the financial system, improve
the efficiency of the provision of financial services, encourage
financial innovation, and strengthen the economic linkage of the
country with the rest of the world. The performance of domestic
banks in recent years in the face of the entry of foreign banks
suggests that the former, some after mergers or partnership with
foreign banks, can compete well with foreign banks. What may be
the'operational issue is the pace and mode of the further
liberalization of entry of foreign banks into the country's financial
sector.
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